

# THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

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## Notes of Recent Exposition.

THE tremendous problem of Church and State has in these days been forced to the front and has again become acute. It has, indeed, never been in abeyance for long, since our Lord uttered the enigmatic sentence, 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.'

The crux of the problem lies precisely in the interpretation of that sentence. What things are Cæsar's, and what things are God's? The answer is not simple, for the reason that things divine and human are so closely interlinked. Both sides have stretched their claims beyond due limits, and Church and State have contended for supremacy down through the centuries.

The papal claim that the Church is supreme, and that the authority of the State is subordinate, was strenuously resisted by the imperial powers throughout the Middle Ages, and was, of course, repudiated at the Reformation. In Protestant countries generally the State claimed supreme authority, and strove to make the Church a branch of the civil service. In Scotland there was a prolonged fight for 'the crown rights of the Redeemer,' and it was believed for a time that a happy solution of the relation of Church and State had been found, which was expressed in the Mesopotamian phrase 'co-ordinate jurisdiction with mutual subordination.' The end of that, however, came in a disruption, not a disruption of the Church as is commonly supposed,

but, as the authors of it strongly contended, a disruption between Church and State.

This gave a big impetus to the modern Non-conformist doctrine of 'a free Church in a free State' which for a time seemed to promise a fair solution. But, by and by, it became increasingly clear that the matter could not rest there permanently. The modern State was extending its activities on every hand. It was taking over works of charity and services, such as education, which had previously been held to be within the province of the Church. By its activities, particularly in education, it was directly affecting the moral and spiritual life of the citizens. So the situation became more and more involved.

The revolutions which have followed the War are, however, the main cause why the relation of Church and State has again become so acute. Russia presents us with the spectacle of the State persecuting the Church with a view to its complete elimination. In Germany and Italy claims are put forward on behalf of the State which are manifestly incompatible with the Church's loyalty to God. Elsewhere, as in Spain and in Spanish America, there is evidence of fanatical antagonism to religion.

All these are portents which cannot be ignored. Accordingly the Universal Council for Life and Work, which is the continuation of the Stockholm

Conference, has been led to decide that the special subject for consideration at the next Conference shall be 'Church, Community, and State.' This Conference will be held in Oxford in the summer of 1937. Already preparatory Conferences and group and individual studies are being pursued in different countries. The aim of this preparatory work is to focus upon the Conference a great body of co-operative thinking and discussion in which Christians of all the different churches and countries may engage. To assist in this a small but very educative book has been published in America, the title of which is *Christ's Way and the World's in Church, State, and Society*, by Mr. Henry Smith LEIPER (Abingdon Press; 90 c.). The writer is the Secretary of the Universal Christian Council, and his book is introduced in a foreword by Dr. W. Adams Brown, the Chairman of the Council.

The aspect of the world as it confronts the Church to-day is very ominous. 'The skies in some parts of the world are reddened by the burning of churches. Christians in nations long devoted, at least nominally, to the idea of religious liberty are faced with imprisonment or worse if they dare to exercise that liberty. The very roots of the Church have been ripped from the soil of some lands. In many others they have been exposed, and are in imminent danger of being cut. Facts such as these have caused many wise men to warn that the Church must become the conscience of civilization, or become its slave. Others go further and say that the Church must likewise unite or perish.' Both Communism and Fascism have undoubtedly supplied many with what is for them a new religion. Their unrest and uncertainty have been changed into a positive, forward-looking creative passion full of buoyancy and irresistible attraction to unthinking multitudes. 'It is in this aspect of Communism and Fascism that one finds the greatest challenge to Christianity. Each contains elements of good, each is fired by a kind of passion for social justice, each utilizes the instinctive idealism of men and women and capitalizes on their readiness to give themselves whole-heartedly to some great movement directed to the bringing in of a better social order.'

In face of this, what does Christianity offer to the world? It offers the power of God for the total redemption of man and society. It offers Christ, the Christian way of life, and the Church as the universal fellowship for the nurture of that life under God. Every one is conscious of how far short the Church has come in fulfilling its function in the world. Yet it would be unjust not to acknowledge how much the Church has done and is still doing to change human life and human society for the better. 'The Church is the only institution in the world which stands for the revelation of God in Christ and mediates that truth and its implications to the individual at every stage in his life day after day and year after year, at times of crisis and in life's routine.'

The world and the Church, the State and society, interpenetrate and overlap. They are made up more or less of the same persons. The conflict, where it arises, is not, therefore, between the State and the Church as entirely separate entities, but rather it is between 'the Christian ideal as represented by those who are trying to realize it in State and Church alike, and the worldly ideal which has its advocates in both.'

What, then, may the State reasonably expect from the Church? It must not ask for definite solutions for vexed economic and political problems, and the Church is not authorized or qualified as such to offer them. But the State may expect from the Church a clear witness to the Christian social ideal even when Christians do not know exactly how it is to be realized. It may expect criticism of all in public life which falls below the Christian ideal. It may reasonably look to the Church to incarnate in individual citizens such a spirit of brotherhood as will make conflict less bitter and co-operation more easy. It may expect from the Church a courageous defence of the liberty of conscience and the right of free speech. It may expect an analysis of current problems in the light of the fundamental, moral, and spiritual principles involved.

If the Church fulfils such functions in the State with fidelity, conflict is sure to arise from time to



time. But such conflict should not be regarded as either normal or permanent. To assume this would really be to despair of the fulfilment of the Church's task, which is to infuse the Christian spirit into the activities of the State. As Dr. Garvie has well said: 'To assume because of the present tension, and even conflict, due to abnormal conditions, that there must be a permanent 'incompatibility of temper' between Cæsar and Christ is to ignore the real gains of the past in humanizing and even Christianizing government, and to distrust the sufficiency of divine grace for human need, the cleansing, renewing, and hallowing influence of the Spirit of God.'

At the same time the Church has ample reason for self-criticism, for it cannot be denied that where the State has shown definite hostility against the Church, part of the explanation lies in the weaknesses and inadequacies of the Church itself. It may be taken as a hopeful sign that there is a growing spirit of self-criticism in the Church, which manifests itself in deep longings for a new vitality, a more effective organization, a more complete organic unity. The Church has often in time past risen to great occasions, and it is not too much to hope that she will be able to find new modes of thought and action through which she will reorientate herself to the tone and temper and tribulation of modern life.

In her brilliantly written book, *Worship* (Nisbet ; 10s. 6d. net), Evelyn UNDERHILL has an interesting chapter on Jewish worship and its influence on Christian worship. She begins with the familiar fact that, seen from the historical standpoint, Christianity in its origin was a Jewish sect. It still bears many marks of this ancestry ; and nowhere more prominently than in its liturgical life. For Jesus the Temple was His Father's house. The petitions of the prayer which He taught His followers are with one exception drawn from Jewish sources. His answer to the question about inheriting eternal life was in the words of the Torah. He was familiar with the Prophets and the Psalter. His most sacred ordinance was instituted at a Jewish ritual meal. He died with the daily evening prayer of every Jewish home upon His lips.

The early Christians continued, like their Founder, to take part in the national worship ; and since the devotional routine of the Temple and synagogue was the only kind of public worship known to and used by them, it inevitably provided the matrix within which Christian institutional worship afterwards developed. The Jewish ritual use of water, oil, bread, and wine, familiar to the Apostolic Church, exerted a direct influence on the form which was taken by the Christian Sacraments. The Jewish Psalter became the first hymn-book of the Church, and still remains the backbone of its ordered daily worship. The reading and expounding of the Old Testament was from the beginning a vital part of the ministry of the Word. Thus Christian worship accepts and completes the devotion of the synagogue, and shows forth in its fulness the spiritual mystery towards which the sacrifices of the Temple looked.

So some knowledge and sympathetic understanding of Jewish worship is essential to any real understanding of Christian worship. The Jewish soul was peculiarly sensitive towards God. It is this, indeed, and this only, which distinguishes Israel from other Semitic tribes. In spite of all her lapses, and in spite of the primitive and coarse elements in her religious life, the history of this people is that of one dominated by that thirst for God and that sense of obligation to God which forms the raw material of all worship. And in the records we find God recognized and adored under two complementary aspects: the Numen, the Eternal, the utterly Transcendent, and also as the Wholly Good, setting a standard of holiness and convicting man of sin. In both, in different ways, He requires the unlimited self-offering and dedication of His people.

With this double vision of God there goes a double tradition of worship: sacrifice and ethic, institutional religion and prophetic religion. Israel's response to God was purest and deepest when these two aspects of man's single self-offering to the Eternal were harmonized: the prophet's deep sense of God's moral demand reanimating, correcting, and spiritualizing the temple worship.



It is true that these two aspects of worship were often set in opposition. In periods of corruption the prophets often spoke like 'pessimistic protestants,' so sick were they of the many perversions of the cultus and its divorce from reality. But it must be remembered that these denunciations were uttered by men whose own deep religious experience was closely bound up with temple worship. They are like the violent condemnations of the shortcomings of the Papacy and Catholic worship uttered later by St. Catherine of Siena.

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So many of the greatest pages in the prophetic writings are concerned with the condemnation of formalism and correction of abuse, that we are apt to forget the true splendour of the institution so jealously watched and so constantly recalled to its ideals. The true line of growth is not to be found in the prophet's unbridled denunciations of ritual, but in the lofty and balanced theism of Deuteronomy or those post-exilic psalms which reproduce the liturgical spirit of the second temple. It is this that stretches all the way from primitive religion to Christian worship, and has made the religious history of Israel crucial for the spiritual history of man.

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From the point of view of its influence on Christian worship, it is not the primitive origin of the temple and synagogue cultus which chiefly matters to us: but its development in the period immediately before the birth of Christ and the religious temper it nourished and expressed. What, in fact, was the institutional worship of those Jews who began Christian institutional worship? And what was the devotional value of their liturgical life? It was dominated by Jerusalem and the temple worship, and was nourished by a deep and instructed reverence for the Scriptures, and by the devotional routine of the local synagogue. All these elements have to be recognized, and, though the dangers of formalism and materialism constantly assailed them, yet they gave the people's life at every level a Godward inclination, and so were made to serve the deepest religious instincts of men.

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The local religious service of the synagogue, which

gave the Jewish Church something equivalent to a parochial system and linked the religious life of every village with the central sanctuary, was the chief liturgical invention of later Judaism. In it, for the first time, ordered corporate worship was dissociated from sacrifice, and centred upon the reading and meditation of Scripture. The influence of the synagogue on the development of Christian worship has probably been greater than that of any other single factor, for it is the ancestor first of the primitive normal Sunday service of the infant Church, next of the Divine Office, and last of the countless forms of free evangelic worship based on Scripture reading, preaching, praise, and extempore prayer.

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It is tempting to look on the worship of the synagogue as representing the prophetic over against the priestly element in Judaism, and therefore as a contrast or even a corrective to the sacrificial cultus of the temple; and even to see in this contrast a foreshadowing of that which is supposed to exist between the Christian ministry of the Word and Sacraments, or more generally between Evangelical and Catholic ideals of worship. But this temptation should be resisted. In the full religious practice of the devout Jew of New Testament times, both temple and synagogue were accepted as the two aspects of one total response to God. They were parts of a single worshipping life, and there was from the beginning a close organic connexion between them. The prayer and adoration of the humblest local assembly were given fresh dignity by the fact that they were deliberately synchronized, and linked in intention, with the great national acts of worship on Mount Zion.

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But beyond all this, our greatest and deepest debt to Judaism is the quality of that realistic conception of God and realistic attitude to God which it bequeathed to the Church, a conception and an attitude which are mainly transmitted to us in the Psalms. The hundred and fifty poems of the Psalter, which still remain the classics of theocentric worship, have probably exerted an influence upon Christian devotional tradition greater than that of any single factor. They still form the sub-



stance of the Divine Office of the Roman, Orthodox, and Anglican communions.

The peculiar function of poetry as the carrying medium of a spiritual intuition, otherwise unexpressed, is fully seen when we consider the Psalter in relation to our whole religious history. Without it we could hardly realize the depth and breadth and height of the devotional landscape within which the historic incarnation took place, for it is the gate which admits us to the inner world of Israel's spiritual experience. If, therefore, our worship is true to the totality of the Judeo-Christian inheritance, it will not be all bright and clear, thin in colour, humanistic, and this-world in feeling. It will retain the ancient sense of cloud and darkness, other-worldly fire and light, which still lives in the Psalter; the awe before a sacred mystery which is with us yet never of us, the deep sense of imperfection, and, above all, the unconquerable trust and the adoring love for a God who has set His glory above the heavens, and yet is mindful of the children of men.

In *The One Way of Hope* (Hodder & Stoughton; 2s. 6d. net), the Rev. A. Herbert GRAY, D.D., speaks to Youth. As one 'in the later sixties,' he addresses 'men and women in the early twenties.' He speaks in language that Youth will understand. He knows what will appeal to Youth. He knows its difficulties about Christianity, and makes an impressive attempt to remove them.

He is no pessimist. He has great confidence in Youth; he has great confidence in the success of the enterprise to which he summons Youth, and in the cure for the world's ills which he commends. The world is in evil case, but it is not past hope. On the rising generation rests the responsibility of saving it. He would despair of the world if he did not believe that Youth may do better than its predecessors. They failed because they did not act on certain convictions which life has forced upon him. They have shown 'how not to do it.' The convictions to which Dr. GRAY has come, he is persuaded,

are nothing but the truths that Jesus taught; and his appeal to Youth is to carry them out.

There are, he points out, two rival movements at present contending for mastery in the world, each of which in the end means ruin. They are Fascism and Communism. The one means international hate, the other class-hatred, and both mean war. Both do injury to personality. Communism, he explains, is to be here understood as the declared policy of the Communist Party. There is much in 'Communism' as a social or industrial theory with which a Christian may agree; but the Communism which is challenging the world is more than that.

Over against both, however, may be displayed the banner of 'applied Christianity' which calls us to act in all human relationships in the spirit of Jesus, and in harmony with His teaching. That is the one way of hope for the world. What is wrong with our world when tested by the teaching, example, and spirit of Jesus? Much; but two things most glaringly so; all that makes for war, and our industrial system with all its stupidities, tyrannies, and waste. As to the latter point, Dr. GRAY freely admits that the path to better things may be long. It is easy to condemn in general terms; it is difficult to bring forward on demand concrete proposals. To find such, or go some way towards finding such, is just part of the task which Youth must tackle.

Dr. GRAY's conviction is that by whatever means may prove practicable, competition must give way to co-operation in industry. 'The present system can be shown to be wasteful. It involves absurdities. It shows signs of breaking down. But beyond all else, it is wrong. It embodies vast injustices to a majority of mankind. It does not bring freedom and opportunity to the average man. It does not distribute its products equitably. In the name of God it must go.'

If applied Christianity is to be the salvation of the world, then, clearly, Foreign Missions are, in view of the present world-situation, 'the most pressing need' of the age. 'There cannot be a



Christian Europe over against a pagan Asia and Africa. Races and nations that have not learned through Christ to love peace, will remain able to destroy the world's peace.' Further, 'The cruelties that remain in non-Christian lands are such as to wring the heart of anybody who has got a heart.' The position of women; the appalling poverty and ignorance; the disease; the superstitious terrors—such things point us our duty. 'The sole hope for the nations of the world, politically and socially, lies in such a spread of Christianity as will make possible the application of the Christian solutions for all our problems.' \_\_\_\_\_

Very impressive, even in a book which all through keeps on the same high level, is the final chapter on God. All our woes, Dr. GRAY holds, have ultimately one profound cause—'we have lost belief in God.' 'Where there is no vision, the people perish.' Our life lacks dignity, power, and significance, because beneath it is no reverence and no trust. He who does not know God cannot understand the world he lives in, and so cannot live truly. Men ignorant or neglectful of God cannot be true leaders, nor understand their fellows, nor have inward peace. \_\_\_\_\_

But can we be sure of God? 'There is only one voice that is worth listening to on the subject of God, and that is the voice of Jesus Christ. And He is worth listening to, because all the truth He uttered was also embodied in a real life.' 'Apart from His life we might have feared that His words were only the beautiful imaginations of an ardent spirit. Wedded to His life they constitute the surest, clearest declaration about God the world has ever known.' \_\_\_\_\_

Unfortunately this truth about God has often been 'mishandled.' It has become involved with, and all but obscured by, doctrinal tenets, ecclesiasticism, and ritual. If it be set free from all such embarrassments, the acknowledgment of God in Christ could save the world. The triumph of the Early Church would be repeated. To know God would deliver men from their fears, and the world to-day is fear-ridden: men would know their

fellow-men as brothers; 'no dictator can flourish among men who know God'; and force would be kept in its proper place. 'From whatever quarter we approach the real issues of to-day, we arrive at the same result. The world's supreme need is the need of such a knowledge of God as will produce trust, and a quiet mind, and a new courage.' \_\_\_\_\_

The Rev. Frederick CAWLEY, B.A., B.D., Ph.D., has written a book which should be of interest to theologians and preachers. It is a study of the 'unique features' of the Person of Christ, with special reference to the Fourth Gospel, and it seeks to make clear the conviction that the Church is right in holding to the 'final supremacy' of Jesus Christ. The title is *The Transcendence of Jesus Christ* (T. & T. Clark; 9s. net). \_\_\_\_\_

In a Foreword the late Professor H. R. Mackintosh says that we should be grateful for any book which leads us a few steps into the treasures of light and truth gathered in the Gospel of St. John, and commends the book before us for the insight, reverence, and tireless love of spiritual truth which its pages display, not to speak of its acquaintance with the best that is being thought and said at this hour on the problems of Christology. \_\_\_\_\_

An impression of the scope of the work will readily be gained from a tabulation of its chapter headings, which are as follows: The Paradox of Jesus Christ, The Uniqueness of His Person, The Solitariness of His Cross, The Finality of Jesus Christ, The Validity of the Fourth Gospel. We shall give an account of the last-named chapter, as representing the author's primary interest as a student of the New Testament. \_\_\_\_\_

In treating of the Validity of the Fourth Gospel, the author asks us to consider four points, namely, (1) its outer validity, or the question of its precise authorship; (2) its inner validity, or the question of the authority of its main presentation; (3) its perennial validity, or its attestation of spiritual reality through the intervening centuries; (4) its

essential validity, or its presentation of Christ as the feasible solution of 'The Riddle of the New Testament.'

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(1) On the first point, outer validity, no definite position is taken. Most scholars of non-extreme schools are agreed that underlying all else are the memoranda of the Apostle John. Mr. CAWLEY says that unless we can stand here, then the personal touches, the precise geographical data, the evidence of the 'Beloved Disciple,' cannot be explained at all satisfactorily. Beyond this, in his opinion, nothing is really clear; and in all probability the problem of authorship will never be solved: Irenæus and Papias will each draw to the last their own adherents.

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(2) On the second point, inner validity, the position is taken that in its spirituality the Fourth Gospel shows an understanding of the inner significance of Jesus beyond that shown by the other Gospels. Further, though the writer of it stands on the shoulders of Paul, as one grateful to him, he gives in full what Paul only gives here and there in asides, fragments, suggestions, namely, a profound life of Christ. Yet, further, however much he may have stamped his own genius upon his material, yet as its prophetic interpreter he has been true to the tradition which held such sway over his heart. As E. F. Scott holds, he seems to have access to a better tradition than the Synoptists.

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(3) On the third point, perennial validity, the position is taken that the Fourth Gospel is linked in spiritual history with this present hour; is always and everywhere spiritually impressive, no matter age or race or culture; finds us at our deepest levels; and therefore expresses a timeless appeal, the compulsion of truth through radiant personality.

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(4) On the fourth point, essential validity, the position is taken that the insistence of the Fourth Gospel throughout on the transcendent Christ most distinctly marks its creative quality for Christian faith and experience; and that only a transcendent Christ can adequately explain the Church's history. The Fourth Gospel is thus an inspired polemic against an attenuated conception of Christ. As such, it is, in Hoskyn's words, 'the supreme background of all the New Testament sets out to declare.' It is to be observed, however, that it finally attests its validity only to the committed heart.

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These four aspects of validity are not clear-cut in their relation to each other, and Mr. CAWLEY has not been able to treat of them as logically separable. Indeed, logical presentation is not his strong point. His strength lies in his sincerity and reverence as a Christian believer, to which may be added his knowledge of recent writings on his subject in the English language.

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# Christian Theology and Moral Principles.

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I THINK I need not dwell at length on the confusion into which the theory and practice of ethics have been plunged by the bewildering rapidity of change in our modern world. The other day, before the British Association, Sir Josiah Stamp was calling attention, in the now usual manner, to the need for a complete revision of our ethical principles and systems. But he showed a deeper insight into the true problem when he declared that, if we are to continue to live with change, we must learn to master it. It is obvious that we cannot master change merely by making changes. We must learn both to understand its causes and to control its direction by fixed principles. And the moment we make any such attempt in the sphere of ethics, we find ourselves confronted by the question: Are there any fixed principles in ethics which can be our guide in understanding and controlling change? Or is the notion of moral obligation, the 'ought' which we apply to human conduct, merely a convenient way of getting most people to do what some people consider for the present to be advantageous? It is my purpose in this article to state what I take to be the fundamental postulates of morality, to indicate some of the problems to which they give rise, and to suggest that in the Christian religion lies the principle of their solution.

I will begin by affirming dogmatically what I hold to be the main fixed postulates of morality; and I will then discuss each of them in turn.

(1) Man has a capacity for genuinely choosing between right and wrong. This proposition raises the problem of free-will.

(2) Man has some genuine knowledge of right and wrong. This proposition raises the problem of the nature and validity of conscience as a cognitive faculty.

(3) Right action is essentially both the expression of a good will and the means to a good end. This proposition leads us to consider the controversy between the doctrine of right for right's sake, and the various forms of utilitarianism.

(1) *Free-will.*

It would not be relevant to our purpose to embark on any general discussion. All I desire to do is to make one or two remarks on free-will as a moral postulate, which are specially relevant in view of the revival of the Pelagian controversy among theologians. Granted that the

freedom of the will is in some sense a postulate of morality, does it follow that a man can always choose to fulfil his moral obligations? Kant answered this question in the affirmative. 'I ought,' he declared, 'therefore I can.' But this inference, though it evidently contains a truth, does not seem to be justified as it stands. It is best criticised by the consideration of a concrete case. If A. owes B. £100 and the debt is due, A. ought to pay; but it does not follow that he can. Moreover, the obligation remains unaffected whether or not it is A.'s fault that he cannot pay. If we suppose A. to be unaware of the debt, or that he honestly but erroneously refuses to acknowledge it, we may still say that he is under some obligation to pay, though not, I think, strictly that he *ought* to pay. On the other hand, the obligation vanishes altogether if we suppose A. to be a person *incapable* of appreciating its nature and of acting accordingly. We should conclude then that, although the existence of a moral obligation does not imply the subject's *power* to fulfil it, it does imply his general *capacity* to recognize such obligation and to act in accordance therewith. To say that a man *is capable* of a certain action means that under certain possible conditions he *would be able* to do it.

This distinction between power and capacity (*ἐξουσία* and *δύναμις*) is of the utmost importance for the understanding of free-will as a moral postulate and of its relation to Christian theology. The whole doctrine of God's grace in Christ depends on the recognition of the fact that from a certain point of view the whole of mankind is under a moral obligation which it lacks power to fulfil. To deny this is Pelagianism. Yet to assert that by the Fall man has lost the capacity to recognize and choose to do his duty is a still graver error. It is to imply that the mass of mankind is past redemption. It is to invalidate the appeal of the gospel to the natural conscience. It is to declare that man has forfeited all that really raises his proper nature above the brute's. The manner and degree in which the special grace of God in Christ is necessary actually to *enable* man to see and choose the right is a legitimate matter of debate among Christian theologians. But the answer to this question does not affect the essential postulate of morality in regard to free-will, so long as the theologian does not deny man's inherent and natural *capacity* to do both.



## 2. *Conscience as a Cognitive Faculty.*

The best definition of conscience is still that given by St. Thomas Aquinas: 'the mind of man passing moral judgments.' The important point to notice is that the definition emphasizes the cognitive or intellectual aspect of conscience. If I judge that I certainly ought to do something, it is implied that I know that this thing, which I ought to do, is really right. This assertion may sound like a platitude. But false views of conscience have gained currency, which obscure its truth.

(a) It is sometimes supposed that, because morality is concerned with conduct, conscience gives a merely practical knowledge which has nothing to do with theoretic or intellectual truth. Such a statement may possibly be justified by arbitrary definition of the terms used; but none the less it is thoroughly misleading. There is such a thing as genuinely practical knowledge. It concerns the adaptation of means to ends; and it consists in knowing *how* to do things. A man, we say, knows how to ride a bicycle or lay bricks or talk German. Some kinds of practical knowledge are of a more instinctive sort, while others demand more learning and methodical direction of effort. But the sole and sufficient proof of practical knowledge is the ability to do a particular thing. It need not express itself in any judgments which are true or false. Now evidently, in order to be able to do right, I must have some practical knowledge. It is no use my knowing that I ought to act unselfishly, if I have no notion how to do so. We have all of us suffered from pulpit-exhortations, which are about as helpful as telling a poor man to be rich. But our natural irritation in such cases only indicates the more clearly that the knowledge that we ought to be unselfish is quite distinct from the knowledge how to act unselfishly. The latter is practical knowledge. The former is strictly cognitive, or, if you will, theoretic and intellectual. It expresses itself in a judgment of conscience which is either true or false. True, all judgments of conscience, in so far as they refer to conduct, are judgments about practice; but knowledge about practice is not necessarily practical knowledge. To know that it is right to speak the truth is as strictly a cognition as to know that the sun is shining in the sky.

(b) Another view of conscience which is erroneous because it ignores its cognitive aspect is that which supposes it to consist simply in a specific form of feeling. The specific feeling of moral approval or disapproval, as Hutcheson and Shaftesbury showed in the eighteenth century, is certainly one element

in what we call a conscientious conviction. But it does not follow that conscience essentially consists in such a feeling and nothing more. If that were so, as Butler pointed out against Shaftesbury, we should be able to find no ground whatever for the authority of conscience. If conscience is only a specific feeling, to say 'I judge this action to be wrong' means no more than 'it excites in me a feeling of disapproval.' And if you say that it excites no such feeling in you, there is an end of the matter. There is no sense in asking which of us is right. *De gustibus, non disputandum.*

Moreover, if we reflect we can easily distinguish between an element of rational cognitive judgment and an element of moral feeling within our consciences. Suppose as a boy I have been brought up to think that all playing of cards for money is wrong. The playing of cards for money will then always excite in me a feeling of moral disapproval. But when I grow up and reflect on the matter for myself, I may see no good ground for this general condemnation, and conclude that the practice is not really wrong at all. If so, it is probable that the feeling of disapproval will not at once disappear. In that case I shall feel to be wrong a practice which my reflective conscience judges not to be wrong. The possibility of such a conflict shows clearly the existence in conscience of a rational and cognitive element, which is quite distinct from mere feeling.

We conclude, therefore, that St. Thomas's conception of conscience is the true one. Conscience is genuinely cognitive; and it is really on that fact that its authority depends. It is a fallacy to assign questions of truth to the intellect divorced from conscience, and questions of right conduct to conscience divorced from intellect. There is a truth to be discerned by conscience, and equally there is a moral standard of honesty which the intellect is bound to observe. Conscience must be intellectual in seeking to judge what is really right, and the intellect must be conscientious in honestly pursuing truth without fear or favour.

But we have not yet mentioned what in the popular mind is the most persuasive argument in favour of the view that moral judgments are mere matters of taste, temperament, or training. How otherwise, it is asked, can we account for diversity and conflict in the content of such judgments?

The fact of such differences is of course indisputable. But what does it prove? There seem to be equally radical differences as to what is true in other fields of thought and study. Yet differences of opinion, for example, in scientific doctrine, are



not usually held to invalidate the whole claim of science to objective truth. I notice that a writer in *Time and Tide*<sup>1</sup> holds it to be proved that differences of moral judgment are due entirely to accidental differences of culture and environment, because among the Kwakiutl Indians and the people of Dobu moral standards prevail which appear to be quite fundamentally opposed to what our Western civilization regards as right or even sane. One wonders why Dobuan and Kwakiutl opinions on psychology or astronomy do not stir in the writer a similar scepticism as to the main doctrines on those subjects which are characteristic of our own culture.

Moreover, it is easy to exaggerate the diversity of moral judgments which actually exist. No doubt believers in a natural moral law have tended to exaggerate the agreement. But an opposite mistake is possible, and is very commonly made, partly perhaps because the word moral is mainly associated with matters of sex, and it is in sexual morality that the most difficult problems and acute differences of opinion are to be found. But, after all, sexual morality, however important, is only one department of ethics. And if we enlarge our views and survey the whole field, the amount of moral unanimity is hardly less striking than the extent of the divergence. At least the vast majority of sincere and well-informed persons would agree that Socrates was a better man than Alcibiades, Francis of Assisi than Cesare Borgia, or Abraham Lincoln than Napoleon I. We have even been assured by those competent to form a judgment that the character of Jesus as presented in the Gospels excites the honest admiration and reverence of multitudes of different races and nationalities, many of whom are far removed from membership of any Christian Church. Even the international politics of the twentieth century have borne impressive witness to the existence of an international conscience, however hypocritical may have been the acknowledgments of its demands. Hypocrisy itself after all is but the homage which vice pays to an acknowledged standard of virtue.

No doubt it may be urged, on the other hand, that Communists, for example, often denounce Christian morality. But, when they do so, it is usually the actual practice of Christians which they mean to attack rather than the moral ideal of Christianity. Popular assailants of Christianity seldom seem to have made up their minds whether they wish to condemn Christians for being too Christian, or for not being Christian enough; and their invective derives much of its psychological force from this

logical defect. But on the whole it is difficult to avoid the impression that it is the failure of Christians, not their success, in living up to Christian standards which is the real ground of objection in most cases. Communists do not condemn our present social system, as Nietzscheans might, for failing to keep the masses under and to send the weak to the wall, or for providing something like an equal brotherhood of men. On the whole they condemn capitalist society for just those defects which most of its thoughtful upholders acknowledge to be defects, though the latter do not believe in Marx's remedy. And the Communist praise of self-sacrifice is an odd feature in an anti-Christian creed.

Again, it may be pointed out that a certain modern school of Protestant theology seems to deny by implication that there can be any important degree of consensus in the moral judgment of mankind. These theologians translate into the obscure language of their own dialectic the ancient doctrine of the total depravity of reason and conscience in the natural man. It would seem that some of them at least recognize no validity in any moral standard save in that which God has by revelation communicated to Christian believers; and the very mark of the divine authority of this standard is that it contradicts all the moral valuations of the natural man. According to the logic of this doctrine, it would seem to follow that the truth, wisdom, and righteousness of Christianity are proved divine by the very fact that they appear to the best of unconverted men as falsehood, folly, and vice. Yet all the while the exponents of the doctrine are eminently respectable and praiseworthy characters in the eyes of their unregenerate fellow-men.

Perhaps the real reason for the apparently unreasonable demands made of conscience lies in a confusion, too seldom clearly recognized, between its authority in its strictly *cognitive* function, and in its *imperative*. In its cognitive aspect the judgment of conscience has an authority analogous to that of any other judgment which claims truth. In its imperative aspect it has an authority which is peculiarly its own. The cognitive aspect of the judgment is properly expressed in the form 'This action is right or wrong.' The imperative aspect is properly expressed in the form 'I ought, or ought not, to do this.' And the two forms of the judgment, though closely inter-related, are not quite identical in their proper meanings. We have seen that the whole authority of conscience depends on the fact that it expresses itself in genuinely cognitive judgments, taking the form, 'This action is right.' If such judgments were not genuinely cognitive,

<sup>1</sup>Geoffrey Gorer in *Time and Tide*, May 23, 1936.



and expressed no more than a specific feeling, the imperative judgment, cast in the form 'I ought,' would lose its moral authority altogether. Nevertheless, in so far as it is strictly cognitive, the conscientious judgment, 'This action is right,' is in principle as fallible as any other cognitive judgment of the mind. Its authority depends on its truth, and, since there is no infallibility, the authority is relative and conditional. It may subsequently be invalidated, if the judgment is found to have been erroneous. On the other hand the imperative judgment, 'I ought to do this,' though it rests upon the cognitive judgment, 'This action is right,' has an authority for my conduct which is unconditional and absolute. For its authority does not rest upon the *truth* of the cognitive judgment, but simply on the fact that the cognitive judgment has been made. Therefore no subsequent discovery of error in the cognitive judgment can invalidate the imperative. If I have followed the judgment of my conscience I have done what I ought, whether or not the judgment that the action was right was mistaken. No doubt, to say 'I ought to have done this' is equivalent to saying (in a certain sense) 'This action was right *for me*,' but it is not equivalent to saying 'This action was right.' In many cases it may be a particular man's duty to do what, objectively considered, is wrong. Even when the cognitive judgment of conscience is uncertain, so that a man can only say, 'On the whole I think this action is probably right,' it may nevertheless be certainly and absolutely his duty to do that action. It is because the peculiar absoluteness of the conscientious imperative is wrongly transferred to the conscientious cognition, that people suppose either that conscience is infallible, or that divergences of moral judgment invalidate its authority.

### (3) *Right Action as Expression and Means.*

The most difficult problems of all come to light when we consider the question whether right action derives its moral value from being a means to a good end or rather from being an expression of a good will. Here we come to the central point at issue between the various forms of utilitarianism, very much alive among us to-day, and the doctrine of right for right's sake usually associated with the great name of Kant.

Let us briefly examine utilitarianism first. By utilitarianism I mean the doctrine that actions are to be judged right or wrong according as they are or are not means to a good end. If right action is right solely because it is a means to a good end, it is obvious that the value of the end must be

something quite distinct and separable from the value of the right action, which is only a means to it. This point can be made clear by an illustration. If I say that the taking of medicine is valuable only as a means to bodily health, I speak truly; for healthy men have no need of medicine. If I say exercise is valuable only as a means to bodily health, I am talking nonsense; for healthy men certainly need exercise. Exercise no doubt is valuable as a means to health; but it is also valuable as an expression of it. The value of health is quite distinct and separable from the value of taking medicine; but it is not quite distinct and separable from the value of taking exercise.

This illustration is really by itself enough to show what a hopeless case strict utilitarianism in all its forms has to defend. The wanderings of the argument always lead back to the one unanswerable point that any kind of life or happiness which can be proposed as a worthy end for the effort of right action must possess something of the same essential value of which we recognize the expression in that action itself. And therefore the value of right action turns out to be not merely instrumental at all. A sphere of being in which the worth of heroism has ceased to exist, in the same way as the worth of medicine has ceased to exist for a perfectly healthy body, would certainly be no land fit for heroes to live in. And this truth is quite as fatal to certain conceptions of heaven as it is to certain other dreams of a Utopia upon earth.

The doctrine, however, that right action is a mere means to an end can be used, not to set before moral effort a goal really unworthy of it, but rather to justify, as means to an apparently worthy end in the future, conduct which would otherwise be altogether repugnant to the conscience. And such is the principal use of the doctrine in the modern world. The older utilitarians, like Bentham and Mill, were too much under the influence of liberal and Christian standards to suppose that acts of oppression and persecution could be instrumental to the realization of human happiness. It is far otherwise with the Communists, National Socialists, or Fascists, who are the modern exponents of utilitarianism. In the future society which is the goal of their efforts they are willing or even eager to admit that quite liberal, if not Christian, standards of conduct should prevail. Personal freedom will then be protected, and love and peace will reign in an equal brotherhood of men. But meanwhile realism leads them to the conclusion that in the present state of the world what is needed for the attainment of that golden age is a ruthless dictator-



ship of the proletariat, a sordid persecution of Jews, the organized misrepresentation of fact by controlled news-agencies, or an unrighteous war of aggression against a primitive people. All such acts, they argue, are really right in view of the end. For in the present all ordinary laws of justice and good faith are abrogated, when the future of State, race, or nation is at stake. In the future Utopia no doubt it will be otherwise. But Utopian standards are for Utopia only.

Here we have the really vicious form of the doctrine that the end justifies the means. Sober reason is not at a loss to point out its fallacies. The moral worth of any future state of society must depend upon the moral temper of its members. But the right moral temper cannot really be produced for the future by the encouragement of an immoral temper in the present. Men do not gather figs from thistles. Either the means which our Communists and Fascists take to promote their end are not really appropriate means at all: Or else the end which they seek has no moral worth, but consists in some 'brave new world,' where man, or some lower animal who retains by courtesy the human name, has abandoned morality altogether. Ends do indeed justify means. But the abrogation of moral standards is not really a means to a moral end. And if the end has no moral value, to talk of moral justification for any means to it is nonsense. So speaks sober reason. But the reason of those to whom it speaks is not sober: it is intoxicated with a false sense of power derived from the use of wireless, aeroplanes, high explosive, and poison-gas.

Perhaps, therefore, it is useless to raise further criticisms of their creed. But a final question must be asked. Granted that a Utopian life of genuinely moral worth is to characterize some future age of history, how and in what sense could its combined happiness and virtue justify as a means to itself the misery and vice of the ages which went before? The end, we may say, is intrinsically more important than the means, inasmuch as the end determines the means and not the means the end. But on what principle can the age latest in time be given this superior importance? Can the life of earlier generations of men be rightly or truly valued as strictly instrumental to the life of the later? Is not the suggestion repugnant to the conscience of us all?

We turn to the doctrine of right for right's sake. According to it it is a matter of indifference for the moral value of right action whether or not in fact it achieves any end that can itself be called good. The rightness of an action consists, not in its being a means to a good end, but in its being the expression

of a good will. The right is related to the good as the means, not of its attainment, but of its expression. If, then, we say that moral goodness consists in the will to do what is right, it seems that the desire to do right must always be the good man's dominant motive. I ought to desire to do what is my duty, simply because it is my duty to do it. Such is at least one interpretation of Kant's teaching.

This doctrine is not as simple as it sounds. Its exponents sometimes forget that all purposive action consists partly in taking appropriate steps to bring about an intended result which does not follow automatically on the decision of the agent's will. We may say that, if A. owes B. £100, he ought to pay him regardless of results. But the actual reception of the money by B. is itself a result which A. may find it difficult or impossible to bring about. Kant would have said that if A. cannot pay B., then he has no duty to do so. And the assertion may, on Kantian principles, be explained by saying that in any case the only moral value of the act of payment lies in the fact that it is the expression of A.'s will to pay: and if the will is present, that is what matters from the point of view of morals. But this analysis of the situation is incomplete. At least it is A.'s duty not merely to will to pay, but also to take all available and legitimate means to do so; and the taking of such means must involve, in a case of difficulty, the use of such thought, prudence, and skill as A. has at his disposal. Unless, therefore, the expression 'the will to pay' is understood to include a good deal more than at first sight it seems to include, its presence is by no means enough to acquit A. of moral censure, if he fails to make the payment. Or again, we may say that it is our duty to tell the truth without recking of the consequences. But to tell the truth is to convey a really true impression of something to somebody, and perhaps to a large number of persons with various capacities for understanding. This is a task which may require the utmost care and skill, as well as mere honesty of purpose; and success in the end is a matter of degree.

It cannot therefore be maintained that the doctrine of right for right's sake simplifies morality by substituting obedience to plain rules of duty for any difficult devising of means to ends. It can do nothing of the kind. It may, however, teach us that, if it is our duty to attain a certain end, we ought not to regard the ulterior consequences which its attainment will have, nor to consider whether the state of things in which the attainment immediately issues is in itself good or bad. Thus, if A. owes B. £100, the doctrine of right for right's sake



maintains A. ought to pay B., even if he has every reason to think that B. will put the money to some criminal use, and that it is a bad thing that he should have it. Similarly, since to tell the truth is right in itself, and the truth ought to be told simply on that ground, a man ought in all circumstances to do his best to convey a correct impression of the facts to those to whom he speaks or writes. What the consequences of doing this may be, or whether it is or is not a good thing that it should be done, does not concern him as a moral agent. In short, the doctrine maintains that we ought to do what is good only because and in so far as it is right to do it, and that we ought not to do what is right because or in so far as it is a good thing to do. This canon rests on the principle that the right is related to the good as the means, not of its attainment, but of its expression. It is the good will of the agent willing to do right which alone gives moral value to his action.

This doctrine can be made plausible in argument, and undoubtedly it emphasizes an important truth against all forms of utilitarianism. Nevertheless, once it is admitted that the moral agent is bound to consider results at least up to the attainment of the immediate object of his purposive action, a doubt arises whether it is not arbitrary to rule out absolutely the consideration of all further results or consequences. It is indeed commonly held that the consideration of such consequences does sometimes justify exceptions to an ordinary rule of duty. Few people would feel bound to tell the truth to an armed assassin concerning the whereabouts of his intended victim. It is difficult to maintain that a physician is always wrong in telling a falsehood in order to save a patient's life. Laws of duty concerning property are similarly held to admit exception 'in cases of necessity.' It is from the possibility of such exceptions that the need for casuistry mainly arises. But the justifying principle of them all seems to be the same. Common rules of duty derive their imperative authority partly from the fact that the observance of them is a condition of the health and well-being of human society. Habits of truth-telling, the keeping of promises, and the honouring of contracts, are foundations of that mutual confidence without which co-operation is impossible. Exceptions to the rules can be admitted only in so far as the exceptions are based on a principle which does not endanger the mutual confidence which the rule aims at establishing. Thus they become exceptions which prove the rule rather than break it. But the consideration of *some* ulterior purpose in the duty to

keep the rule must be allowed. Otherwise we shall find ourselves, as rigorists always do, involved in ethical absurdities.

It thus becomes impossible to avoid the conclusion that utilitarianism and the doctrine of right for right's sake are each of them one-sided and defective. The main interest of the utilitarian is the realization of the good in human society. He judges individual conduct as a means to this end. But he forgets that moral action is from the beginning more than an effort to bring some unrealized good into existence, and cannot therefore be judged simply by its success or failure. Moral action is also the expression of a good will, and its value as such an expression is at least to some extent independent of any success it may have in achieving the object aimed at. On the other hand, the main concern of the upholder of right for right's sake is the expression of the good will in individual conduct. All questions of the consequence for society seem to him irrelevant in estimating the moral value of action. He does not want the goodness of the thing achieved to enter into the reckoning at all. He does not want to judge by success or failure. But he is apt to forget that all purposive action consists in using means for ends, and that therefore the wise direction of the means so that the end may be really achieved cannot be altogether left out of the account. If we maintain that it is irrelevant to the strictly moral value of an action whether or not it is rightly calculated to achieve some external end, we are saying that ethics must treat action solely as a *gesture*, a gesture being definable as an action the purpose or value of which is confined to what it expresses. Thus, while utilitarianism tends to make virtue merely prudential, the doctrine of right for right's sake tends to make it merely quixotic. For it is the essence of quixotic action that it has no value beyond that of a gesture.

Again, utilitarianism is so occupied with the goodness of the object or end to be achieved by action, that it omits the consideration of the agent's will and motive as morally valuable in themselves. The doctrine of right for right's sake, on the other hand, concentrates its attention so exclusively upon the agent's will and motive that it forgets that the very goodness of the agent's will must depend upon its being directed to achieve something good in itself, not something which is good simply because it is the agent's duty to do it. The doctrine of right for right's sake sets a high value upon disinterestedness. The good man, it tells us, must do what is right simply because it is right, *i.e.* because it is his duty to do it. But if the agent

is to be directly desirous of doing his own duty, rather than of doing what is in itself good, he ceases to be really disinterested at all. For he becomes interested in his own disinterestedness, and his virtue is self-centred after all. Dr. Kirk has suggested that it is precisely in order to avoid such a danger that our Lord so constantly taught that the unselfish service of God and His Kingdom does bring a reward.

It is in truth the Janus-faces of moral action which are the moral philosopher's perplexity. It looks both ways, backwards towards the motive of the will which initiates it, and forwards towards the object in or through which it finds its end. The right in action is doubly related to the good, both as the expression of a good will and as the means to a good end. Neither relation can fairly be excluded from the account in the full moral valuation of an action. No doubt it may be pointed out that, in certain cases at least, failure to achieve its object in no way detracts from the moral value of an act. But certainly if we suppose that the moral activity of mankind as a whole must end in failure, however heroic, to achieve and realize the good, then it is difficult not to judge that its moral value is impaired; for we are then obliged to think of human virtue as a mere impotent gesture, as Mr. Bertrand Russell represented it in *The Free Man's Worship*, so that it begins to wear a tinge of self-centredness and melodrama. The highest self-sacrifice requires some faith that sacrifice is not ultimately made in vain, but achieves an object which is not confined to its own self-exhibition. Yet, on the other hand, moral endeavour and self-sacrifice are certainly in vain, if all they succeed in producing is a state of being, whether in heaven or earth, wherein they themselves have been entirely left behind as a ladder can be kicked away when the climb is finished.

The only ultimate solution of the problem lies, I believe, in the Christian doctrine of the creative and redemptive love of God. If we believe in this love as the source and guide and goal of human effort after the good, we do not in any way invalidate the moral consciousness of mankind with its conceptions of right and of duty, but we are enabled to pass beyond it and to solve its problems on a higher level. It is instructive at this point to borrow an analogy from art. The master artist or composer or poet does not invalidate the elementary rules of technique which he once learnt as a pupil, although in his mature work he is clearly their master, not their servant, and seems occasionally to break them altogether. His ultimate justification

lies in the fact that the rules were not intended to be rigidly observed for their own sake, but to be observed as aids and guides to true artistic creation. In that creative activity both their value and their limitations are clearly seen. The man who has never learned to observe rules of technique will never be a great artist; but the mere observance of rules will never produce a genuine work of art.

Now Christianity with its doctrine of the new creation in Christ Jesus calls all men to be, each in his manner and degree, creative artists in good life, which is then seen as the expression and embodiment of that same love in which Christ Jesus was incarnate and died and rose again for men. The ordinary rules of moral duty are not invalidated by this fresh call. But they are seen not as rules to be slavishly observed for their own sake, but as tutors designed to bring us into the freedom of Christ's new creative work of love, so that in Him we can co-operate in building up that new corporate humanity which has the eternal at its heart. There are many degrees of attainment as well as different kinds of vocation even in Christian living here below. In many ways we still have to be pupils under tutors, and dare not yet claim our full freedom as children of God in Christ Jesus. Yet Christians know that there is a motive in action higher than mere duty, and an end to be achieved higher than the mere doing of right for right's sake. There is the giving of life for the love of God and man; there is the self-sacrifice which finds its reward beyond death itself in the final redemption of mankind. And the Christian knows also that he will not be judged at last by the degree in which he has kept mere rules of moral conduct, but rather by what he has succeeded in creating even here below in the service of that love in which he has believed.

The Christian therefore cannot be a believer in right for right's sake or be content with a merely Kantian moralism. But neither can he be a utilitarian. To suppose that right action is a mere means to an end is an absurdity to him. For the ultimate end for which he serves God is nothing but the perfect expression in all created beings of that same love which is even now the source and inspiration of every act which in the highest and deepest sense is right. The perfect expression of that love in all things is what the Christian means by the life of the world to come. But that life of the world to come, just because it is eternal, is not simply future in the sense that it leaves behind altogether the self-sacrifice by which it is attained. A creator's perfected creation, even if it



be only a human artist's creation of which we are speaking, does not leave behind the effort, or even the agony, by and through which it was wrought; they remain for ever expressed even in the beauty and peace of its achievement.

Finally, it is this view of morality as ultimately serving the purposes of creative love, which alone can enable us to keep our heads as well as our hearts, and direct wisely and rightly the changes of our changing world. Mere common rules of moral conduct may have to be revised to an indefinite extent. Let us not shirk the fact, or the pain and

disturbance which it must bring. But if we hold fast to our belief in God's love for human souls, and in His will to express that love in this world and the world to come, through life and through death, then we shall hold fast also to that permanent principle which will prevent change from slipping into chaos. The one prophecy which can be made with some degree of assurance about the world as we see it to-day is this, that, if it does not become much more Christian than it is, it will speedily become much less moral than it has been. But there is hope as well as fear in the signs of the times.

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## The Beatitude of the Forgiven.

BY THE REVEREND JAMES REID, D.D., EASTBOURNE.

'BLESSED is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered. Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity, and in whose spirit there is no guile' (Ps 32<sup>1-2</sup>). This is a picture of the soul which has found the final secret of peace and blessedness. It is the doxology of the forgiven heart. It describes, as fully as a man in these days before Christ came could know it, what forgiveness really is and, what is even more important, the only way into it.

What we call the conviction of sin is the inescapable experience of those who would know God or who become alive to goodness and its challenge and appeal in any noble form. We cannot admire a fine deed of self-sacrifice or unselfish devotion without the thrill of admiration being followed by the sense of our own defect. That, in a rudimentary form, is the conviction of sin. There are other ways in which it may come home to us. A disastrous moral failure will bring it home—what Stevenson calls 'a killing sin.' It disturbs our self-complacency. It slays our self-respect. It is felt within us as an act of betrayal of that ideal which somewhere slumbers in the breast of every man. It may come home to us also when we look round on the world with all its dark injustices, and realize that we are enjoying our privileges at the cost of a mass of human suffering and sacrifice which we do little to relieve and for which we may be returning little or nothing to the community. 'Will anyone tell me how I can live an innocent

life?' asks one of the people in *Legends of Smokeover*, as he thinks of the cost to others of our privileges. But this conviction of sin comes home to us fully when the vision of God in His goodness and love breaks upon us. It was the immediate result of Isaiah's vision of God. 'I saw the Lord high and lifted up. Then said I, Woe is me! for I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips.' So it was also with Job. 'I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes.' When Bunyan's Pilgrim began to read his Bible he came under conviction of sin. He was not a bad man according to his lights. He had done no crime. He was loving and kind to his family. But the immediate result of seeing that Face which looked in on his soul from the pages of the Bible was a sense of sin that was as real as a load upon his back and by no jugglery or strategy of the mind, nor by any kindly expostulations or friendly badinage of his companions, could it be lifted. It is one of the most realistic descriptions of guilt in literature, and it rings true, for it was Bunyan's own experience, and it has been repeated in every case where the sense of God's reality comes home to the heart. A modern version of the same thing is found in Masefield's *Everlasting Mercy*. The village drunkard was awakened to the conviction of sin when the woman in the public-house brought him face to face with Christ and showed him that

his sin was the betrayal of Almighty love, the crucifixion of the Son of God afresh.

'Saul Kane,' she said, 'when next you drink,  
Do me the gentleness to think  
That every drop of drink accursed  
Makes Christ within you die of thirst,  
That every dirty word you say  
Is one more flint upon His way,  
Another thorn about His head,  
Another mock by where He tread,  
Another nail, another cross.  
All that you are is that Christ's loss.'

Millions, since Christ died, have found that to see Him is to be brought into this inescapable conviction of sin. 'In the Cross,' wrote one, 'I saw how much God cares, and then I saw how little I care.' It is that double vision of the love of God and our own lovelessness which is the gift of the Cross, and therein lies its power to bring us into a new life.

### I.

But this sense of sin, of evil things which we have done and of our own condition of heart, brings us face to face with a problem. How shall a sinful man be right with God? The nearer we come to Him, the more we feel the sense of our unworthiness. The more we are open to His light, the more it stabs us to the heart. The more we are drawn to His perfect purity and righteousness and seek to be at home in it, the more does the shadow darken in our hearts. That is our problem, and it is as old as the ages. How shall we find rest in God and yet find shelter from that in His Spirit which is a perpetual accusation? How shall we face the truth, without guile, and yet find peace?

Man has tried many ways of peace. He has tried the way of propitiation by forms of sacrifice. The Old Testament is in part the record of this technique of peace through sacrifice. The offering of sacrifice was, in sincere hearts, the symbol of penitence, and they had the assurance that thereby their transgression was obliterated. But in other cases it brought no amendment of life, and then it was a hollow sham, a mere shelter behind which they could go on sinning. Through the prophets God broke in on this artificial shelter from conscience and smashed the unholy structure to pieces. 'Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil?' 'He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?'

Men have sought peace in various other shelters

from the light. There is the ordinary way of self-excusing. 'I am just as good as other people,' we say. Or we think of the kind and decent things we have done and take refuge there from the blinding light. Some have sought shelter in penances of various kinds. They have made pilgrimages, scourged their bodies, toiled on their knees, as they do still up the Sancta Scala in Rome. It is all an attempt to put up a shelter against the truth, or at least to ease the burden that lies so heavy on the soul. Others have tried the way of good works. They have elaborated methods of acquiring merit by which the balance in the books against them may be restored and the accusing debit cancelled out. The defect of all these methods is that they are a flight from reality, and they are useless as a way of enabling us to stand in the full light of God's presence and be at peace in it. Even the Cross of Christ can become an unworthy shelter. There are ways of stating the doctrine of the Atonement which make it only a strategy of escape. To think of the death of Christ, for instance, as a means by which Christ so bears the guilt of our sin that we can be free of it, may be to seek peace by fleeing from reality. For can any one bear the guilt of our sin? The consequences of it can be borne, in part at least, and those around us, to go no further, do bear these consequences every day. The shame of it can be shared and love will share it. That is implicit in the solidarity of our life together, and the fact that makes it possible is the root of our joy as well as of our pain. But can any one bear our guilt, the responsibility for what we have done, when it is we who have done it? Can even Christ take this burden so that we are no longer in fact guilty, and leave us in a moral world? There is meaning in Toplady's hymn which makes appeal to all our hearts at moments when the burden of sin comes home and the accusing finger points.

Rock of Ages, cleft for me,  
Let me hide myself in Thee.

But whatever its meaning and its comfort it cannot remove the guilt of sin. That burden is ours and we must bear it. 'I acknowledge my transgression and my sin is ever before me.' That is moral reality, and the way of moral reality is the way of life. There is a sense in which a good conscience is an impossibility. 'A good conscience,' says Dr. Schweitzer, 'is an invention of the devil.'

### II.

But how, then, shall we find peace, much less blessedness? It is just through this willingness to



be utterly sincere and to face the facts in the clear light of God and to reject all shelter and evasion. That was the way the Psalmist took. For his peace is the fruit of an experience which he goes on to describe. He tells how he became aware of his sin and the torment of mind and spirit into which it brought him. 'Day and night thy hand was heavy upon me: my moisture is turned into the drought of summer.' What lies behind that we do not know. But it was the experience of a soul which was exposed like a naked, treeless landscape to the rays of a blinding sun. But he faced the light, made no excuses, offered no satisfactions, sought no shelter from the pitiless light. He opened his life up to God without evasions. 'I acknowledged my sin unto thee, and my iniquity have I not hid.' Then peace came. For somehow he discovered that that blinding light was the light of a Love that was waiting to heal and to forgive and forget and to draw him into an unmeritable fellowship. 'Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered . . . unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity, and in whose spirit there is no guile.'

The way of peace is the way of utter reality. That is the fact that comes home. And it comes because God restores to us, when we are in that condition, His fellowship. Nothing, when we are honest, stands between us and Him. That is the meaning of forgiveness. It is the meaning of pardon. It is the meaning of the phrase that 'God imputeth to us no iniquity.' The common idea of forgiveness as the cancellation of a debt, or the removal of a stain, or the erasure of a sentence of condemnation which God has passed upon us because His law has been broken, obscures to some extent its mighty meaning. It arose from an imperfect conception of God, the conception of Him as Judge assessing a crime and imposing a penalty, or as a Creditor toward whom we have incurred a debt. But these pictures of God which have elements of truth in them are dissolved into Christ's picture of God as Father. A father's longing is not to balance the son's accounts or wipe out the wrong he has done from his own mind or the boy's. It is something much deeper and more wonderful. It is to restore him to fellowship. That cannot happen till the son is in the mind to be restored, till, in fact, he becomes morally real with himself and with his life as it appears in the light of God's truth and purity. Till that happens he is like the prodigal son in the parable before he set out from the far country to come home. He is not then in the condition in which fellowship is possible. For

fellowship with God is only possible if we have come into the world of moral realities and are prepared to live in it. If the son had come home still unchanged at heart, blind to his sin and its nature, unrepentant, there could have been no fellowship with his father. For they would have been living in different worlds. There would still have been a barrier between them. Even if he had received the ring and the robe and been welcomed to the privileges of the home, his heart would still have been estranged from the father. That barrier on the son's part was removed when he came to himself, realized the world of moral reality and broke out into the cry, 'Father, I have sinned against heaven, and before thee, and am no more worthy to be called thy son.' When that change had taken place and the son was utterly open about his sin and saw himself for what he was, the father's forgiveness was able to flow out and bridge the gulf and call him, 'My son.' Love restored him to fellowship. He knew the blessedness of the man who is forgiven, to whom is imputed no iniquity and in whose spirit there is no guile.

The real barrier to God's love is not anything we have done. It is the condition in which we are. It is the attitude of our mind and spirit towards Him and His world. Consequences are in themselves no barrier except that the worst consequences are within ourselves—the moral disablement and blinding power of sin. For sin coarsens and hardens and dims the moral vision. As Burns said, 'It hardens a' within, and petrifies the feeling.' Even our guilt is no barrier to the love of God. For to be aware of guilt is in a sense to be aware of moral realities. It is the first step toward home. It is like the pain of a limb that is released from bonds that have paralysed the nerves. The pain which follows release is the sign of returning life. We are nearer God when we are convicted of sin than we were before our eyes were opened, even though at that moment we seem farther away from Him. We are aware of sin because we have come into His world. But our guilt is no barrier to God's love. It is that moment for which love has been waiting and watching as the father in the story watched for the prodigal's return. The moment we return to God and out of the prison of our remorse look up to Him, that moment He is waiting to receive us to His fellowship. He does not need to impute to us a righteousness we do not possess, as the old theology has it. For even God cannot impute to us a righteousness we have not got. The true view of imputed righteousness is that when we are penitent and have the spirit of faith

we are righteous in the only sense in which righteousness can be ours which is that of possessing a broken and a contrite heart. But that has in it no merit of our own. For it is His Spirit which has awakened it, even as the thought of his father's love, when in the swine-fields the mist of passion was cleansed from his eyes by suffering, awakened in the son the spirit of sonship and made him long for the father's fellowship. We can still say,

Nothing in my hand I bring,  
Naked, come to Thee for dress;  
Helpless, look to Thee for grace.

It is all we can say. For even our penitence is all of His love.

'Tis mercy all, that Thou hast brought  
My mind to seek her peace in Thee.

When we are there facing the reality of our own sin, though the pain of it run deep, and bearing the burden of our guilt from which we can never wholly escape, we are in the condition to receive God's love. With that we must be content. There is a sense in which the longing to be delivered from the pain of guilt is born of pride. For it is the desire to receive a forgiveness which will make us right in our own eyes, and that can never be. We are still sinners at the best of it, even after God's forgiving love has come home to us with the music of incredible mercy. The best we can hope for is that the memory of our sin will be swallowed up in the unfathomable depths of the experience of God's grace. The blessedness of being forgiven is the knowledge that in spite of what we have been we have the unspeakable gift of His love.

### III.

But what of the consequences of sin? Guilt is one of these and there may be others. These we will have to bear except that the worst of them, which is the havoc sin has wrought within us by making us what we are, is gone since we are changed. They will have to be faced, but they will be faced with God and in His fellowship. That makes a mighty difference. For the gift of forgiveness is something even more than restored fellowship. It is this incredible fact that God stands in with us, taking on Himself the whole burden of the situation into which sin has brought us both within and without. This is a great truth which many people have not realized. God can enable us to meet these consequences so that in His fellowship they are transformed and made to serve our good and

the good of others. Our guilt, for instance, becomes a purifying power. What does the Psalmist mean by saying, 'My sin is ever before me'? Does it not mean that the knowledge of his sin remains as a purifying power making him more tender and reverent and keeping alive in time of temptation the sense of moral values? It is like the flaming sword which we are told was held by the angel to guard the gates of Paradise lest those who had sinned should try to re-enter it. But now since God has restored us to His fellowship we are back in the paradise from which our sin had driven us, and that flaming sword of our remembered sin guards the gates lest in some moment we should turn back into the far country of exile and of estrangement from God. Many of those who carry with them in their hearts the scars of the wound which sin has made, find that the very pain of the wound, though love has healed it, keeps them humble and dependent and morally sensitive both to their sin and to the Love that has redeemed them. Against that dark background we see the golden colours of His love aflame with beauty and hope as the autumn sunset blazes out against the purple outlines of the hills and tinges them with glory.

Yes, Thou forgivest, but with all forgiving  
Canst not renew mine innocence again;  
Make Thou, O Christ, a dying of my living,  
Purge from the sin but never from the pain!

As for the other consequences of sin, these will have to be faced so far as we can. Some things we can undo. Zaccheus said to Christ in that wonderful moment when His friendship invaded the loneliness of his estrangement from God, 'The half of my goods I give to the poor; and if I have taken anything from any man by false accusation, I restore him fourfold.' That was the amount which a thief had to restore, and this man out of the joy of his new friendship with Christ was ready to take that place of moral reality and to be true to it. The prodigal was not asked to repay what he had squandered. We can be sure, however, he would be ready to work his fingers to the bone to make restitution, but out of a new-found love which would make it easy, not out of a hard compulsion. If there are things we ought to do in order to be true to this new moral world into which we have come we shall do them. But God will be with us enabling us to face the hard way in the spirit of love and gratitude. As for those consequences which like blown leaves in a wind have gone beyond our control and cannot be gathered up again, we must leave that burden to God. He



will see to it. Many people find these consequences the hardest thing to meet. They have wronged some one deeply, too deeply for any recovery they can make. It may be some one who has been brought through their sin into moral degradation and has drifted down out of their life. The thought of this havoc in the soul of others is like a gnawing pain for which they can find no anodyne. But God has His own way of meeting that situation. The new centre of redeemed life which has come into our soul through God's love will have an influence beyond our ken. God will guide these currents that He has set flowing within us for the redeeming of the world around us. That task we must leave to Him. It is one of the unseen and mysterious results that come from putting the whole situation into His hands and leaving Him to work in it transformingly. For His forgiveness of us, His standing in with us means more than our transforming; it means also the redeeming of our world and of life around us wherever we touch it as we walk together, He and we, through the years. This is an unspeakable comfort. It is part of the peace that passeth understanding. It is part of the blessedness of sin forgiven.

To sum it all up, the conviction of sin brings us into a moral world in which God's love reigns. And through His fellowship we have power to step into it and live in it. We can only keep our place in this world on terms of utter sincerity. It is

only on condition that we are utterly honest with ourselves that we have fellowship with one another and with God. 'If we walk in the light . . . we have fellowship one with another,' says John, 'and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin.' The strange fact is that His grace can so triumph over sin that He can make out of the old estrangement and ruin of it something beautiful. It will be different from what it might have been had sin not been allowed to invade our life, but it will be none the less beautiful: That is His victory. He is like a craftsman of genius who takes the debris of some ruined building and makes of it a new structure which might almost be said to justify the catastrophe which brought the ruin. 'Happy are the associations,' says Thornton Wilder, 'that have grown out of a fault and a forgiveness.' It is this victory of grace that makes St. Paul put the question, 'Shall we then sin that grace may abound?' To that there can be only one answer. No one who has seen the Cross which reveals what our sin cost God can ever listen to such a suggestion. But this is the amazing paradox of love that through the sin that sent us into exile and brought us into the despair of the lost, God finds the opportunity to show us His Infinite Love. It is this Love which is the blessedness of the redeemed. Even the pain and despair of guilt and loneliness become worth while if through them He has found us and brought us home.

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## Literature.

### THE MORALITY OF CRISIS.

IN *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (S.C.M.; 6s. net) Mr. Reinhold Niebuhr has written in a penetrating and provocative way about the problems of the soul in its relation to society. It is strange that in an age which seems to have succeeded in banishing the devil from its theology, the category of 'the demonic' should have become so alarmingly prominent in ethics, especially in the group-egoisms of 'immoral society.' It is also interesting, as the sign of the end of an era, that in ethics as in theology there is a revival of apocalyptic ideas. So in Barth, in the theology of crisis, and also here in ethics in the morality of crisis, we see the extreme reaction from humanism resulting

in an apocalyptic attitude to human nature and to the facts of the world of our day. While Niebuhr would probably claim for his own position that it is a kind of prophetic realism, it is quite obviously the ethical counterpart of the Barthian reaction. But Barth's theological apocalyptic tends to become socially quietistic, while Niebuhr's ethical apocalyptic is socially evolutionary, as well as fiercely polemical against an idealism based on illusion, and against rationalism and naturalism in all their forms. He 'is almost inclined to agree with Karl Barth that this ethic "is not applicable to the problems of contemporary society nor yet to any conceivable society."' Both are doctrines of disillusionment, but if it be true that 'Luther trusted the redeemed man; Calvin trusted no man'

(McGiffert), both are thoroughly Calvinistic. Yet there is an ethical passion about Niebuhr which contrasts most favourably with Visser t'Hooft's interpretation of Barth's ethical attitude: 'We may warn each other, we may share experiences, we may point each other to the Gospel, but in the last analysis we must stand aside to watch God at work.' Niebuhr does not stand aside to watch—no more can we.

The first chapter contrasts his 'independent Christian ethic' with current liberalism and orthodoxy on the one hand, and with Marxism on the other. His use of the word 'mythical' to describe the central truths of our faith may puzzle some readers, but, as he explains, he uses it not in the sense of something illusory and unreal, but as Berdyaev says, 'Myth is a reality immeasurably greater than concept.' When the natural and the supernatural meet, life can only be expressed in terms of 'myth,' as Plato knew. Niebuhr refuses to follow orthodox Christianity 'in its premature identification of the transcendent will of God with canonical moral codes' or Marxism in its apocalyptic utopianism. Both liberalism and Marxism are 'secularised and naturalised versions of the Hebrew prophetic movement and the Christian religion.' His aim is to steer a middle course between idealistic dualisms and naturalistic monisms, and to maintain the tension between the transcendent and the historical, which alone makes a religion ethically fruitful.

In the second chapter he examines 'the ethic of Jesus, and finds it transcendent in the sense that it cannot be directly applied and formulated in a code of 'a prudential ethic which deals with present realities.' 'The ethic of Jesus is the perfect fruit of prophetic religion,' and follows logically from its presuppositions. It has an eschatological element and even basis. 'Anything less than perfect love in human life is destructive of life,' but 'with Augustine we must realise that the peace of the world is gained by strife.' The love-perfectionism of the Gospels is both inevitable and impossible.

In chapter three he joins issue with the assumption of liberalism, 'that human nature has the resources to fulfil what the Gospel demands,' but at the same time he refuses to agree that the Creation was really the Fall, as if finitude in itself was the essence of sinfulness, whereas it is the arrogant pretension of the finite creature to make himself into a god that does the mischief. This leads to a discussion in the next chapter of the 'relevance of an impossible ethical ideal,' where

he has very pertinent things to say about the relations of the regulative principles of justice and equality to the ideal of love, and generally about the influence of religion in accentuating the demonic pretensions of political and economic structures, and in promoting instead of lessening strife. 'Christianity has been more frequently a source of confusion in political and social ethics than a source of insight and constructive guidance.' The only exceptions he allows to this startling indictment are Thomist Catholicism and Calvinism.

Chapters five and six continue the criticism of Christian orthodoxy and liberalism, in further discussion of the relations of the law of love to the realities of politics and economics, with a wealth of historical allusion to show how Christianity has 'always had to borrow from some scheme of rationalism to complete its ethical structure,' and, yet has challenged and transcended every phase of culture and civilization. The last two chapters deal with 'love as a possibility for the individual,' and 'love as forgiveness,' for 'the crown of Christian ethics is the doctrine of forgiveness.' Here the conflict becomes most acute, for 'love as forgiveness is the most difficult and impossible of moral achievements.' On the levels of justice and mere morality it is completely impossible, where claim meets claim, and the best to be achieved is a workable compromise. For the enmity between man and man is not only rooted in natural divisions but is nourished and accentuated by our idealisms. There is no deeper pathos in the spiritual life of man than the cruelty of righteous people.'

The Kingdom of God remains transcendent. An individualistic absolute ethic which shuts its eyes to the demonic perversions of our best endeavours, and all evolutionary, educational, reformist policies are alike inadequate. Yet we are saved from complacency as from despair by faith. We can neither solve our problems nor leave them alone. 'The vitality and the resulting anarchy of human existence is the vitality of children of God.'

Whether or no we grant Niebuhr's assumptions or agree with his conclusions, we cannot but profit from the fearless pungency of this admirable book.

#### *TWO RECENT BOOKS ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL.*

Two recent books on the Fourth Gospel are of much interest because they give the ripe conclusions of two Biblical scholars who have devoted many years to the study of its teaching. Principal



W. F. Lofthouse's *The Disciple Whom Jesus Loved* (Epworth Press; 3s. 6d. net) consists of four lectures delivered at Cambridge in the summer of 1935 to visiting students in connexion with 'the Vacation Term for Theological Studies.' The subjects treated are: The Fourth Gospel and its Author; Hellenism in the First Century A.D.; The Religious and Theological Conceptions of the Fourth Gospel; and The Fourth Gospel and Christian Belief. Dr. Lofthouse examines the various objections which have been brought against the traditional view of Apostolic authorship, and comes to the conclusion that 'to be frank, there is nothing that is really inconsistent with the work of an eye-witness.' He is also far from thinking that the Gospel is deeply influenced by the Hellenism of the first century, and maintains, on the contrary, that it 'is one long protest against the fashionable views that surrounded the author.' 'The author,' he says, 'has no doctrine of the *logos*. Save as a means of attracting the attention of his readers at the beginning of his work, it would appear even that he has no interest in the *logos*. His interest is in the doctrine of the Son.' In the last two lectures Dr. Lofthouse repeats many of the arguments presented in his book, 'The Father and the Son,' and, in particular, his contention that the characteristic teaching of the Evangelist can be derived from no one else save Jesus Christ Himself. The book is written in a popular style and is impressionist in character; it contains many valuable and striking thoughts, but the conclusions, we suspect, fall rather too easily 'on the side of the angels.' There are one or two small errors. It is not true that 'all' students recognize identity of authorship with the Gospel in the case of 1 John, and the saying of the Baptist (in Jn 1<sup>29</sup>) is not recorded twice. Moreover, does not the meaning of this passage call for discussion?

Canon J. O. F. Murray's *Jesus according to S. John* (Longmans; 15s. net) is built upon a different plan, but reaches similar reassuring results. The writer's object is 'to enable the student to see what help the Evangelist can give us in forming a coherent picture of the public ministry of Jesus,' including 'the nature of the office with which He had been entrusted' and 'the inner life of communion with His Father in heaven.' The book is really an attempt to rehabilitate the traditional authorship and estimate of the Fourth Gospel. For example, the former Master of Selwyn says that, 'from a strictly literary point of view, the internal evidence for the authorship of the son of Zebedee, as Lightfoot and Scott Holland present it, is overwhelming.'

We gladly bear witness to Canon Murray's expository powers and the spiritual insight of much in his devotional treatment of the subject-matter of the Gospel.

#### KARL HEIM ON WORLD PROBLEMS.

Karl Heim's Sprunt Lectures have been published under the title *The Church of Christ and the Problems of the Day* (Nisbet; 6s. net). The lectures were originally written in English, and only once or twice will the fastidious reader guess that the writer is not an English-speaker born. Karl Heim has enriched theological thought already, and the thought has been sometimes not too easy for the ordinary reader. This work will present no such difficulty. It is simply but forcibly written on subjects that the plain man, if he be a thinker at all, is profoundly interested in. The problem dealt with is that which has confronted us all since the collapse of our optimistic confidence in inevitable progress. Rationalization has broken down. It did good service up to a point, but beyond that it will not go. It breaks down before the brute fact of the struggle for existence. There are only two ways open to us—despair or faith in God. Very interesting is his second chapter which deals with the new 'German' faith. That he represents as an attempt to evade the dilemma—despair or faith in God. It really offers no way of escape from our distress; it is only an attempt to evade frank facing of the question as to the reality of God. There follows a chapter on the significance of Luther's thought for the present day. Then we have discussion of the reality of sin and atonement; Christ, His Church and the world; the power of prayer, and finally, 'I am the Resurrection and the Life.' Every chapter is rich in significance and suggestion, and we cordially commend this book. It deals with the most living problems of our day, problems with which from time to time every minister must deal if he is not to miss a great opportunity. There is widespread in our day, with all that seems so superficial and cynical, a wistful heart-hunger for reassurance and certainty in a shaken world, and we can recommend no book better than this as a guide and example and instructor.

#### BRUNNER'S GOD AND MAN.

*God and Man* (S.C.M.; 5s. net) is a group of four essays by Emil Brunner; they are entitled respectively—The Philosopher's Idea of God and the Creator God of Faith; Faith in Justification and

the Problem of Ethics; Church and Revelation; Biblical Psychology. Brunner himself gives the book the sub-title 'Four Essays on the Nature of Personal Being.' The first, second, and third essays are at first reading more connected than the third; but all four make a unity. The argument in brief is as follows: the Reformers showed that the attempt to synthesize the findings of philosophy and revealed truth is impossible, for all philosophies agree in making God and the thinker fundamentally one, while Christian Faith affirms a God who is Divine Personality, Divine Initiative. In the second essay it is held that rationalist ethics has two species—idealistic legalism and realist eudæmonism. Both trust man himself to achieve the good; both are legalistic, impersonal, self-centred, and in the issue self-righteous. Only Christian Faith releases us from ourselves, and makes us truly free agents. In the fourth, Brunner similarly shows that no scientific psychology does justice as Biblical psychology does to the fundamental facts about human nature, that man is a sinful being with a chasm in his nature. The third essay deals with the Church as the vehicle of the message of Salvation.

Presupposed all through is Brunner's distinction between general and special Revelation. One may here and there find difficulty in understanding all Brunner's points, and one may find the conception of Revelation as he uses it somewhat baffling; but no one will read these essays without great profit.

The value as well as the interest of the book is increased when we notice that it has been translated very competently by Rev. D. Cairns, the son of Principal D. S. Cairns. Further, that Mr. Cairns is the able grandson and son of very distinguished forebears is abundantly testified by the exceedingly able Introduction which he has contributed, in which he draws an informative contrast between Brunner and Karl Barth, and does us a great service in discussing the distinction of a special from a general revelation.

### THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

The Rev. G. L. Prestige, D.D., did much work for the projected Lexicon of Patristic Greek, so much indeed that he found himself with a pile of material far in excess of what the Lexicon could use. He has put that to good use, and in consequence has given us a portly and very learned work, *God in Patristic Thought* (Heinemann; 12s. 6d. net). His aim is to give a critical account of the important terms employed chiefly by the Greek Fathers, and on that basis to explain their doctrine: It was a

long process of hard thinking that had to be undergone; mistakes were made, and had to be corrected; terms were tentatively employed, some were discarded, others had to be given a new shade of meaning. But Dr. Prestige is convinced that the perilous undertaking had to be faced in the interests of the truth of Scripture and Christian experience; and he is persuaded that on the whole the formulation of Trinitarian Doctrine as the Greek theologians finally attained it is impressive and of abiding worth.

He crosses swords with writers like Harnack and Mackinnon, who blame the Greek theologians for 'corrupting' the Gospel by forcing it into the mould of Greek philosophy. He reminds us that it is the duty of the Christian thinker to go on thinking; and holds that so far from forcing Christian truth into a Greek mould, precisely the opposite was done—philosophic terms were modified to suit Christian truth. There are in the book fourteen long chapters, and we have not space to analyse any of them. What has been said may suffice to indicate the scope of the book. The conclusion Dr. Prestige reaches is this: the Greek theologians were confronted with the problem of doing justice to monotheism on the one hand, and on the other to the revelation of God as threefold in Christian experience. 'It was laid down that God is a single objective Being in three objects of presentation.' 'God is one object in Himself, three objects to Himself.' 'In more modern language,' but 'in loyalty to the spirit and meaning of Greek theology,' it may be said that 'in God are three organs of God-consciousness, but one centre of divine self-consciousness. As seen and thought, He is three; as seeing and thinking, He is one.'

### LIFE HERE AND NOW.

Lord Ponsonby's book, *Life Here and Now* (Allen & Unwin; 10s. 6d. net), will certainly evoke interest, stimulate thought, and doubtless be widely discussed. It is well written in language that the plain man can understand. It deals with metaphysical puzzles about Time in a way that proves that Lord Ponsonby has read widely and pondered deeply. There is much in the book with which we heartily agree. For its value lies in its emphasis on the old maxim, 'Act in the living present.' It is a new and forcible exposition of the gospel of work. It reminds us that we are often mistaken in our judgments of value, and never so much as when we belittle our own possible influence. So far we gratefully acknowledge Lord Ponsonby's contribu-



tion, and appreciate his powerful plea in particular that now is the time for each individual to determine and make known what is his attitude to war. But where he and his Christian readers will part company is on his quite politely expressed demand that we should abandon faith in immortality. To him it is an incubus; to us it is an inspiration. No doubt he marshals strong arguments against it, some of which the ordinary Christian would find difficulty in meeting. No doubt as soon as we begin to picture future conditions in any detail, we fall into confusion and probably contradiction. Immortality is of Faith, not of knowledge; and it is a pity that Christian thinkers ever attempted to give definite form to those things which, according to St. Paul, it hath not entered the heart of man to conceive. What is to be our inspiration to make that most of 'Here and Now' which Lord Ponsonby so strongly urges? With him it comes to this—so doing we shall make a better world for posterity. But in the course of time this will be a world uninhabitable by man, and all human values will, in consequence, on Lord Ponsonby's view, perish and disappear. He lays stress on the value of the evanescent. But the evanescent has no value save for some mind; and when no mind is left, what can be the value of anything? in particular, of striving to make a better world for posterity?

#### THE PROBLEM OF POLYCARP'S EPISTLE.

In an appendix to his recent work on 'The Primitive Church' reference is made by Professor B. S. Streeter to an interesting suggestion communicated to him by Dr. P. N. Harrison, to the effect that what has come down to us as the Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians is really two letters—a short letter, comprising chs. xiii. and xiv., written at the time of the death of Ignatius, and a longer letter (chs. i.–xii.) written ten years or more later. The suggestion is at once interesting and important, because its verification would not only solve problems of interpretation which have vexed the minds of Lightfoot, Harnack, and many others, but throw additional light upon that still obscure period of Church History, the first half of the second century.

Students of this period of Church History will be glad to learn that Dr. Harrison has now worked out the suggestion above-named (which met with the approval of the late Dr. F. C. Burkitt), and has presented the evidence in detail in a learned and scholarly volume entitled *Polycarp's Two Epistles to the Philippians* (Cambridge University Press; 21s. net).

The Epistle of Polycarp contains two apparently conflicting series of indications as to the circumstances of its own origin. One of these series points to a date not many days after the departure of Ignatius from Philippi, when his friends in Smyrna, having heard of that departure, were looking forward with intense interest and concern to further news of him. The other series points to a much later date, when Polycarp, as well as the Philippians, must have known for some time beyond all shadow of doubt that Ignatius had suffered the fate of martyrdom which his friends had hoped against hope would not befall him.

Dr. Harrison is of opinion that there is a real contradiction here, and that the only way to resolve it is to abandon the assumption, entertained by Lightfoot and Harnack, and indeed all parties hitherto, of the Epistle's unity. It is to assume instead that we have here two different Epistles written at different times by the same author.

It is Dr. Harrison's contention, supported by much careful investigation, that the adoption of this two-letter hypothesis leads to a more credible notion than has been held hitherto of the way in which things really happened in the period A.D. 100–150; and he would now welcome a thorough discussion of his hypothesis on the part of patristic scholars.

His volume, which is clearly and attractively written, is furnished with a noble bibliography, as also with the Greek text and a translation of Polycarp's short but significant letters.

JOHN CALVIN.

Emeritus Professor James Mackinnon, Ph.D., D.D., D.Th., LL.D., of the University of Edinburgh, has added another volume to his notable list of publications in general and Church history. It is entitled, *Calvin and the Reformation* (Longmans; 16s. net). It may be regarded as a companion volume to his four-volume work on 'Luther and the Reformation.' It has been published timeously in the quatercentenary year of the first appearance of 'The Institutes' and of the commencement of reforming activity at Geneva (1536). And it is marked by the careful scholarship, the profound learning, and the clearness of exposition which one has come to associate with Dr. Mackinnon's name.

It is explained in the Preface that the present work is not a biography, but primarily a critical survey of the Reformer's work and influence, into which the biographical element only enters as far as it is relevant to the survey.

The Introduction contains a sketch of the Reformation at Zürich under the leadership of Zwingli, which provided in its general features the model for the Reformation at Geneva and the other parts of Switzerland. Then follows the critical survey of which the book is mainly composed, and which is arranged on the lines of the historical sequence of events; beginning with the early days of Calvin, advancing through the story of the reorganization of the Genevan Church, and of the opposition encountered (including the tragedy and 'scandal' of the fate of Servetus), and closing with an account of Calvin's services, not only as the champion of the reformed cause against Rome, but also as mediator in the internal quarrels of the Reformed Churches in Germany and Switzerland, as director of the evangelical mission to his native France and other western lands, and as the protagonist of the reformed cause in the sphere of international politics. The concluding chapters treat of Calvin as a theologian, presenting an outline of the contents of 'The Institutes'; and of Calvin as a man, showing a balanced estimate of his character and significance.

Dr. Mackinnon, as the following words of his clearly show, is fully alive to the fact that Calvinism does not influence the twentieth-century mind as it did that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: 'If John Calvin were to be born anew in the early twentieth century, he would have difficulty in recognizing himself in large numbers of his modern spiritual descendants. He would seek in vain for the theocracy and the consistory in Geneva or elsewhere. He would find the members of the Theological Faculty of its University, and of many other Universities, criticising his doctrine of predestination and reprobation. He would find many critics in the theological schools applying the higher criticism to the Scriptures, without incurring disqualification for the ministerial office. He would find that historic investigation had gone considerably beyond his depth in its treatment of the origins and early development of Christianity. He would find leading theologians disposed to give even Servetus a judicial hearing in the debate over the Christology of the Greek Fathers.'

### WORSHIP.

The 'Library of Constructive Theology' has given us several books of conspicuous worth, such as Canon Barry's 'The Relevance of Christianity' and Professor Mackintosh's 'The Christain Experience of Forgiveness,' but we question if any of the previous volumes possesses greater distinction of

matter and manner than the latest, Evelyn Underhill's *Worship* (Nisbet; ros. 6d. net). The book is divided into two parts. The first part expounds the fundamental characteristics of Christian worship, its 'theocentric yet incarnational' temper, the way and degree in which ritual, symbol, sacrament, and sacrifice enter into it, and the many strands that are gathered up and expressed in the Holy Supper, and finally the need and place of both corporate and personal worship. These fundamental principles are illustrated in the second part by chapters describing different historical types of worship, from the Jewish, through the early Christian, the Catholic, the Reformed, the Free Church worship to the Anglican tradition.

This bare description of the course of Miss Underhill's thought gives little idea of its beauty and fulness. Any one who knows Miss Underhill's previous work will be prepared to find here the two features of all her writing, a profound spirituality, and, along with this, an unusual sanity of judgment. However 'far ben' she penetrates, she never loses sight or hold of realities. It is this, perhaps, that accounts for the kind and sensible recognition of worth and truth in unlikely quarters. She detects the Divine element lying in the crudest forms of primitive superstition. And (what is far rarer) she appreciates the truth and goodness in forms of worship that are not her own. 'My wish has been [she writes] to show all these as chapels of various types in the one Cathedral of the Spirit.' Catholic, Free Churchman, Presbyterian, Jew, Anglican—all will find their own forms appreciated here with a sympathy and understanding that are the fruit of a really catholic mind. Of the book as a whole we may say that it is a rare and precious possession.

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*Towards Peace of Mind* is an attractive title for a book (Allen & Unwin; 6s. net), because it is the one thing every human being is seeking. Dr. Karl M. Bowman, Chief Medical Officer, Boston Psychopathic Hospital, has written the book, and presents us with a sort of guide to successful living. He deals with inheritance and its limiting effects, the glands and their influence, instincts and emotions, problems of child training, fatigue, alcohol, sex, tobacco, education, worry, fear, and most other things. If peace of mind can be gained through mental and physical hygiene, chiefly mental, then Dr. Bowman will show you the way. It is not that the doctor ignores the place of right beliefs, but that the beliefs that are right seem to be the beliefs



that are useful. If this book has the limitation that all such books have, it at any rate deals with a multitude of practical problems in a practical fashion, and on its own level furnishes an element of sane guidance for practice.

A very striking principle is laid down in *Thought and Imagination in Art and Life*, by Katharine M. Wilson, M.A., Ph.D. (Allen & Unwin; 7s. 6d. net). It is that feeling and not reason is the guide to truth. With most people it is a feeling judgment that determines their appreciation of art. It is the same with the determination of our acts and our attitude to truth. A 'feeling apperception' of a general truth is as legitimate an approach as a reasoned one. That we have a strong feeling about a fact may be in itself an indication that the fact is a true one. Most of the principles people use as guides are determined as much by their feelings as by their reason. Our minds are fitted to recognize truth when we see it, and the mere statement of it carries conviction. Relying on this general creed, Dr. Wilson discusses art and life, imagination and children's stories, the sense of humour and the moral sense, love, consolations, and instinct and immortality. The essays are detached, but all have the common approach and assumption indicated above, and they are all delightful to read.

The Rev. A. M. Coleman has published a little book entitled *Six Liberal Thinkers* (Blackwell; 2s. 6d. net). He is obviously in sympathy with Liberal or Broad Church Anglicanism, and his sympathies have led him to write six articles (five of which have already appeared in various periodicals) not only on such moderns as F. C. Baur, D. F. Strauss, Mark Pattison, and E. Hatch, but on Clement of Alexandria and Erasmus. The articles are informative on popular lines, and the treatments of the various subjects as diverse as the subjects themselves. There is not much in the pages that may be called topical, unless it be the remark quoted from Dr. Elliott Binns: 'What is troubling us to-day is not only original sin, but also aboriginal stupidity.'

It would not be easy to find a more interesting and well-informed account of China and Chinese Missions than is given in *China Calling*, by the Rev. Frank Houghton, B.A. (China Inland Mission; 1s. 6d. net). The style of the book is unusually vivid and popular, while as to its substance it gives just the right kind of information. Its pages are crowded with facts about the country and the

people, the religious and political situation, and the methods and progress of Christian missions. In a searching discussion of missionary methods the significant fact is mentioned that in recent years, while the number of missionaries in China has diminished by over two thousand, the China Inland Mission in response to a great appeal of faith has increased its staff by over two hundred. The book may be warmly commended to all who are interested in the fortunes of China and her Christianization.

The Church of Scotland Youth Committee have reprinted from their magazine *Morning Rays* a series of booklets containing simple Bible stories for very young children. On one page is a brief sentence in large type, and on the opposite page a picture. There are twelve booklets, each with its story occupying six or seven pages. The pictures are well done, and the words are simple enough for a small child to grasp. The booklets are to be strongly commended. They are issued by the Publications Committee of the Church of Scotland, Edinburgh, at 1s. 2d. by post for the twelve.

*The Church of Scotland Year-Book* for 1937 is ready. It is full of information, and will be found quite indispensable for all ministers, office-bearers, and church workers. It seems to us to differ from many church year-books in the comparatively small space given to lists of ministers, leaving the bulk of the volume free for the various branches of the church's work. Its contents page makes an impressive show. One item which should not be missed is the very interesting account of the Right Rev. Daniel Lamont, D.D., Moderator of the Church, 1936-1937.

Recent political events have brought Zionism so much to the front that there is some danger lest we should regard all Jews as Zionists. A short article by Dr. C. G. Montefiore in the 'National Review' for December 1936, aims at correcting this impression, and insists that, in the view of many, true Judaism is a matter of religion, not of race or of politics. In a recent pamphlet, *The Jews: Race, Nation, or Religion?* (Dropsie College, Philadelphia; 75 cents), the distinguished American-Jewish scholar, Solomon Zeitlin, Ph.D., seems prepared to adopt a similar position, though he confines his formal argument to the period of the Second Commonwealth (538 B.C. to A.D. 70), and expressly leaves open the possibility of later modification. His work is mainly a study of various terms used—Hebrew, Israelite, Jew, etc.—both in Hebrew and in

Greek. Before the Exile the common name was 'Israel,' and 'Jew' ('Judahite') was confined to subjects of the southern kingdom. After the Exile, 'Jew' could be, and commonly was, applied, not only to the Judæan community, but also to that of Egypt. It thus had a religious and not a political signification, and, similarly, the Greek term *δρόφυλος* might include proselytes from any race, and dwellers in any State, even outside the Roman Empire. Only after the destruction of the Second Temple did the old name 'Israel' reappear, 'Jew' being contemptuously retained by the Gentile world.

Once or twice Dr. Zeitlin might have cited other evidence in addition to that which he actually adduces. In illustration of the last point mentioned, he might have noted that the word 'Christian' seems to have been originally a contemptuous nickname. And, in citing the well-known Temple notice forbidding *ἀλλόφυλοι* to pass beyond the great balustrade, he might have quoted the inscription on the surviving tablet, which differs slightly from the form preserved in Josephus. But his argument is clear, well stated, and, apparently, convincing.

The high standard of Duckworth's Theology Series is fully maintained in Principal T. Hywel Hughes's *Psychology and Religious Origins* (Duckworth; 5s. net). The first three chapters deal respectively with the relation between Psychology and Religion; Psychology and the Origin of Religion; Psychology and the Nature of Religion. The remaining four treat of the rise of religious ideas—God, Worship, Sacrifice, and Immortality. All through the treatment is lucid and thoroughly competent. A great variety of views is considered, and Dr. Hughes's criticism is sound. We have no hesitation in saying that this is undoubtedly the book which by reason of its fulness, compactness, and clarity of treatment is fitted to become a textbook for students, while still profitable for the general reader who wishes enlightenment on the present position in the study of the psychology and so far also the history of religion.

There have been so many studies of the Lord's Prayer, critical, devotional, and homiletical, that one would imagine there was no room for more. Yet the great themes of the faith must ever be handled afresh and commended to each new generation of readers. *The Lord's Prayer in Modern Life*, by the Rev. R. Guy Ramsay, M.A. (Kingsgate Press; 2s. net), is a commendable example of this. The exposition is not in any special degree connected with modern life. It is a simple, straightforward

restatement of an old and familiar theme. It passes lightly over critical points and aims at the spiritual guidance of the general reader. The subject, familiar as it is, is treated in a fresh and interesting way, and is illuminated by a number of apt illustrations. It should prove very helpful for Bible-class study.

Dean Inge in his retirement still continues to bring out of his treasury things old and new. His latest book, *Freedom, Love and Truth* (Longmans; 12s. 6d. net), is designated in the sub-title 'An Anthology of the Christian Life.' It consists for the most part of a catena of quotations from more than a hundred religious writers in prose and verse. 'The reader,' Dean Inge says, 'must dip into the book, and mark the extracts which "speak to his condition."' I have tried to make this anthology representative of Christian piety, not only of my own predilections, but I have deliberately drawn by preference from our Anglican writers.' These quotations are arranged in order under such main headings as the Necessity of Religion, God, Jesus Christ, the Fruits of the Spirit, the Inner Life, Life's Pilgrimage, the Journey's End. Among the writers quoted, Jeremy Taylor takes pride of place with extracts extending in all to over twenty pages. Some of the prose quotations, it may be felt, are unduly long, but the book is full of gems. In a most interesting introductory essay, Dean Inge discusses the question of what the Christian life means. He finds it to have the essential character of a spiritual discipline, an unworldly frame of mind, a mysticism which has deep affinities with the religious philosophy of the Neo-Platonics.

*The Threefold Bond*, by the Rev. Reginald Kirby (Marshall, Morgan & Scott; 2s. 6d. net), has a title which does not throw much light on the subject of the book. It is in the main an exposition of John Owen's work, 'Of Communion with God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.' This is introduced by a short sketch of the great Puritan divine, and is followed by some studies of the practical issues of communion with the Triune God. John Owen's writings, however solid, have never been regarded as easy or attractive, and it may be doubted whether this brief exposition will commend them to the modern reader. Owen's arguments also as to the possibility of communion with each person of the Trinity distinctively would seem to go beyond safe Scriptural ground. The introductory sketch is easily the most interesting part of the book, while the concluding chapters, in which communion with



God is treated as having practical issues in the conquest of fear, in spiritual victory and consecration, contain much that is of value.

The Very Rev. R. H. Malden, Dean of Wells, is of opinion that the Apocrypha has fallen into undeserved neglect in England, partly through the action of the Reformers in the sixteenth century in relegating its books to a position of inferiority, and partly through prejudices which prevailed during the early part of the nineteenth century: since the year 1825, the British and Foreign Bible Society has on principle refused to print the Apocrypha. Accordingly, Dr. Malden has issued a volume bearing the title of *The Apocrypha* (Milford; 4s. 6d. net), comprising a course of six lectures recently delivered by him in Wells Cathedral. He shows very clearly the relation of the Apocrypha (or deuterocanonical books, as he would prefer to call it) to the Bible, and explains how the books of the Apocrypha came to be written. Then he proceeds to indicate their contents, dividing them into works of fiction, wisdom literature, works of history and prophecy, and apocalyptic works. There have been other recent guides to the Apocrypha besides this of the Dean of Wells, but we commend his little book very heartily for its conciseness and attractiveness.

The Dean of St. Paul's is a busy man. He is Editor of the Library of Constructive Theology, and, in addition to his own numerous writings, he has become responsible for a new series, 'The New Library of Devotion.' The idea of this series is that, as the older devotional classics do not make the same appeal to the man of to-day as they did earlier, devotional literature to be helpful must take account of the mental and spiritual atmosphere of our own time. No book could more fitly fulfil such an aim than *The Veil of God*, by Principal H. Wheeler Robinson, D.D. (Nisbet; 2s. 6d. net). God is hidden from us, not only by His own Majesty, and by our sin, but in other ways. Nature, history, man's own experience, the Bible, death are, or may be, all veils concealing God. Dr. Robinson deals with each of these 'veils' in turn. His book is in one respect different from older devotional manuals. It is not merely meditation. It is full of hard thinking, and aims at 'comfort' by enlightenment. It deals with many of our commonest and most perplexing difficulties, and always reasonably and helpfully.

The Rev. Hugh A. Studdert Kennedy, brother of the better-known 'Woodbine Willie,' has written a book, *And I will give Him the Morning Star* (Putnam; 6s. net). It is a book into which he has put a great deal of himself, and contains reflections on life and death, on sickness and sin, which are seriously, even passionately, held. They will not be easily understood or accepted by many others. Mr. Kennedy leans heavily on Mrs. Eddy and her 'Science and Health,' and his philosophy is a kind of idealism which is now somewhat of a 'back number.' But his book deserves consideration, if only for the earnestness with which he deals with many of the problems that urgently confront the common man.

Justice, long overdue, has at last been done to the work of Thomas Sherlock, who was Bishop of Bangor, 1628, of Salisbury, 1734, and finally of London, 1748-61—*Thomas Sherlock, 1678-1761*, by the Rev. Edward Carpenter, M.A., B.D., A.K.C. (S.P.C.K.; 15s. net). Mr. Carpenter has had access to many manuscript sources hitherto untapped. Sherlock's lot was cast in stirring times, and his influence on many questions was considerable, alike in Parliament and in theological controversy. In politics the country was agitated by such crises as the Spanish War, the South Sea Bubble, the Porteous Riots, and the Jacobite rebellions, and Sherlock had his own views on all. But more important was the part he played in the Deistic controversy, in which he expressed some views and used some arguments that have more than a mere historic value. Mr. Carpenter writes well, and has given us not only an interesting but an informative book.

*From an Office Window*, by Mr. J. W. Jessop, M.A. (Stockwell; 3s. 6d. net), contains the reflections of a business man who, after the rush of early life, has found some leisure to look round and take stock of things. Kindliness is perhaps the note that principally characterizes his book. There is nothing very original or revolutionary about these reflections, nor are the pages lit by any literary allusions, but the writer discourses very pleasantly throughout on such themes as Business, Leisure, Materialism, Foreign Competition, the State, the Empire, the Clash of Colour. The views expressed are marked by strong common sense, and the reading of the book will fill a pleasant hour.

# The Best Books on the Philosophy of Religion.

BY THE REVEREND PROFESSOR JOHN BAILLIE, D.D., S.T.D., D.Litt., EDINBURGH.

THE term 'Philosophy of Religion' first came into English as a translation of Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie*, and it still bears upon it the marks of its origin. In Hegel's view, philosophy occupied a higher standing-ground than religion, and it was the business of the philosophy of religion to survey our religious ideas and convictions from this higher standing-ground. Some such view as this seems to be implied in the term itself; hence it is more and more tending to be abandoned by those of us who believe that no such higher standing-ground exists, and that, as Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Barth have all united to persuade us, we cannot hope to penetrate the real secrets of religion except by taking up our stance within the community of believers. Yet even within that community itself there are two outlooks which are possible. There is, as St. Anselm said, a simple faith and there is a *fides quaerens intellectum*. There are believers who have little understanding of what they do in believing, and there are believers who make it a main business of their lives to understand what they do in believing. Both alike may be saints, but only the latter are theologians. Theology is thus an attempt on the part of those who know themselves to have been called of God to clarify their minds as to the nature, conditions, and implications of their calling. It is, as St. Anselm said again, a *meditatio de ratione fidei*, an inquiry concerning the logic of faith. If the term 'Philosophy of Religion' be still retained, it may be used as a name for the discussion of the more general and preliminary aspects of the theological question, the discussion of the more detailed issues being spoken of as 'Dogmatics.'

Our religion has come to us from Judæa, but our understanding of it has come mainly from Greece, which is indeed not surprising when we remember that our understanding of almost everything we do understand has come to us from Greece. The **beginnings of theology**—in the sense defined, according to which the best religion need not be theological nor the saintliest believers theologians—are therefore to be looked for among the Greeks. When the student passes from the reading of Plato and Aristotle and such fragments as remain from the other great theologians of ancient Greece to the theologians of the early Christian period, he is conscious at once of an immense spiritual advance

and of a certain intellectual decline. The greatest of the Greeks brought superbly true and straight thinking to bear upon the very lean religious heritage that alone was theirs; the Christians had entered into an incomparably richer spiritual inheritance, but the powers of mind they brought to bear upon it were much less remarkable; and hence it was inevitable that the theologians of early Christianity should have borrowed the intellectual apparatus of the Greeks for the reflective interpretation of their own much fuller religious life. Had they been greater thinkers than they were, they might still have borrowed much; but what they borrowed would have been much more radically transformed in adaptation to the new material and, as it were, baptized into Christ. In the Middle Ages, after thirteen hundred years of Christian thought, this intellectual debt of the theologians to the Greeks had in no way diminished, but rather increased. Protestant theology has attempted to break with this tradition of dependence, and in a number of important respects has succeeded in doing so to its own great advantage; yet it remains true that the greater part of our intellectual equipment is still Greek in origin, and that there are few theories the history of which does not begin in Athens or Ionia. The list of 'Best Books on the Philosophy of Religion' must therefore begin with Plato's *Euthyphro*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Timæus* and *Laws X*, Aristotle's *Metaphysics XIII* and *Ethics X*, and, as providing some idea of the contents of the hundreds of lost theological treatises of the following centuries, Cicero's *Concerning the Nature of the Gods* and *Concerning Divination*.

From these the student will naturally go on to study the most important treatises belonging to **the early and middle Christian centuries**, and here the selection is easy. Precedence over all other books must be given to St. Augustine's *City of God*, St. Anselm's *Monologion* and *Proslogion*, and St. Thomas Aquinas' two great *Summae*. The Thomist tradition has so dominated the Roman Church that nothing of like importance or originality has since been contributed from within that communion. But no doubt our list should include at least Cardinal Newman's *Grammar of Assent*. Modern Thomism is well represented by Dr. Hubert S. Box's *The World and God*, and Erich Przywara's *Polarity*.

Next in order would come the **classical works**



**of early Protestantism**—Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Melancthon's *Loci Communes*, which has never been made sufficiently accessible to English-speaking students or sufficiently studied by them, and Zwingli's *De Vera et Falsa Religione*. Luther is equally important, but his teaching is scattered throughout his numerous works rather than systematically set out in any one of them. The best summary of it is in the first volume of the late Karl Holl's *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*.

The orthodox Protestantism of the **seventeenth and eighteenth centuries** produced nothing of such importance or originality as these sixteenth-century works. The new fertilizing impulse came rather from the opposition—from the varying forms of rationalism and freethought. The most remarkable books of this period are Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (the book with which the late Professor Pfeiderer held the philosophy of religion, in the full modern sense, to have been inaugurated), Lord Herbert's *De Veritate* and the fourth book of Locke's *Essay*. From the extensive apologetic literature which attempted to reply to such rationalism, one volume at least still retains a certain measure of importance—Butler's *Analogy*. With Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* this period may be said to have closed.

The new period began with the work of Kant. Kant and Hume are both **thinkers of the transition**, but Hume in the end must be given to the old period, and Kant to the new. In any list of the 'Best Books on the Philosophy of Religion' prominent place must be given to the three *Critiques* and the *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (now available in a very serviceable American translation), which may be studied with the help of Professor Webb's *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*. From Kant we pass naturally to Hegel, whose great *Philosophy of Religion* has already been mentioned as having provided our discipline with this particular name. The later Hegelian philosophy of religion forms a considerable body of literature by itself, but our own John Caird's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* is as good a sample as any, and no other need be mentioned here. Of like importance with Kant, however, for the inauguration of the **new period** was Hegel's great adversary, Schleiermacher, whose *Speeches on Religion* and *Christian Faith* must both be placed on our list. Finally, the two traditions of Kant and Schleiermacher unite and correct one another in the Ritschlian School, which must be represented on our list, not only by the third volume of the master's

own *Justification and Reconciliation*, but also by Herrmann's *Communion of the Christian with God*.

Such being the major classics of our subject, we must now attempt some sort of selection from the large and varied mass of **contemporary contributions**. It might be thought that such an article as the present should deal with these alone. The question reflects an important difference of opinion as to how the subject can best be taught and learned. My own conviction is that the best introduction to the philosophy of religion, as to philosophy generally, is not in the study of an up-to-date, eclectic text-book of a systematic kind, but in the study of the *history* of the subject, and in the cultivation of a first-hand acquaintance with the thought of its leading figures. Nevertheless the subject is undoubtedly being advanced in our own time, so that a certain amount of contemporary reading is necessary for every student.

Dr. F. R. Tennant's *Philosophical Theology* is a remarkable work which no student can afford to neglect, yet it is in many ways out of line with the prevailing tendency of thought in our time—seeming almost to be a development of eighteenth-century rather than of nineteenth-century thought.

More typical of the period just closing are the many treatments of the subject which take Hegelian idealism as their background, and yet develop an ever-deepening criticism of its orthodox forms. Belonging to this class are A. S. Pringle-Pattison's *Idea of God and Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*; W. R. Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God*; the Archbishop of York's *Nature, Man, and God*; and the Dean of St. Paul's *Studies in Christian Philosophy*. G. Galloway's more eclectic text-book, *The Philosophy of Religion*, must also be mentioned. More independent in standpoint is Professor Hocking's most suggestive and interesting volume, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. Josiah Royce's *The Sources of Religious Insight* may also be found useful.

In England, however, the older Platonic tradition has always held its own, side by side with the later versions of idealism; and it is with this tradition that one would have to associate what are among the very best and most serviceable books that are at present available to the student, Dr. C. C. J. Webb's *Problems in the Relations of God and Man, God and Personality, and Divine Personality and Human Life*; Professor A. E. Taylor's *The Faith of a Moralist*; and Canon Hodgson's *Essays in Christian*

*Philosophy.* If this list were a longer one, we should have to mention also the contributions of the late Dean Rashdall and of Dean Inge.

Had one been writing a few years ago, one would have felt bound to take particular notice of the realist, pragmatist, and organic-biological opposition to Platonism which had been gaining force ever since the eighteen-nineties. The most important documents of this movement are (so far as concerns the philosophy of religion) William James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*; Samuel Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity*; C. Lloyd Morgan's *Life, Mind, and Spirit*; H. Bergson's *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*; and (though with a more frankly naturalist strain) John Dewey's *The Quest for Certainty*. This, however, is a type of view which seems to be going out of fashion very rapidly. Partly in the same tradition, but with a broader basis, are Professor A. N. Whitehead's *Religion in the Making* and *Process and Reality*.

From these one must turn to certain books whose ancestry and affinities are of a very different kind, and perhaps more Ritschlian than anything else. A very influential work has been Dr. Oman's *Grace and Personality*. Dr. Oman's influence is carried on in a modified form by Professor Farmer's *The World and God*, which, however, is equally important as introducing the English student to some of the more recent trends of which we have still to speak. Another book in the Ritschlian tradition which is well worth reading is William Morgan's *The Nature and Right of Religion*. Two books with very similar titles are Dr. W. P. Paterson's more eclectic *The Nature of Religion*, and Dr. E. W. Lyman's *The Meaning and Truth of Religion*, which excellently represents recent American thought.

It has been said that the dominance of the Thomist tradition has (whether for better or for worse) tended to arrest the further movement of thought within the Roman Catholic communion. Yet of all recent writers in the English language it is a Roman Catholic author who has gone farthest in breaking new ground and leading us forward to fresh fields of thought. This is Friedrich von Hügel, whose two volumes of *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, together with the unfinished Gifford Lectures on *The Reality of God*, can alone be mentioned here. Two continental Roman Catholic writers are also worthy of inclusion as leading us forwards from the thought of yesterday towards what is likely to be the thought of to-morrow—Jacques Maritain, to whose views the volume of essays called *Art and Scholasticism* will serve as a better introduction than any of his more strictly

theological works, and Karl Adam of Tübingen, from whose several translated works I would single out the two essays on *Christ and the Western Mind* and *Love and Belief* as the best introductory samples. Passing from Romanism to Eastern Orthodoxy, mention must be made of Nicholas Berdyaev, though his larger volume on *Freedom and the Spirit* hardly bears out the promise of such earlier essays as *The End of our Time*.

Von Hügel, though much of his work was done before the Great War, anticipated many of the directions of thought towards which the minds of others first began to turn during the post-War years. The same is true of that remarkable young man, the late T. E. Hulme, whose fragmentary *Speculations* must undoubtedly be given a place in our list. After the War, however, the new movement of thought was to make itself felt over a very wide front indeed. It was to be connected in part with a revival of interest in the Danish thinker, Søren Kierkegaard, after a century of neglect. And here reference must be made to a number of philosophers whose reflections bear closely on the religious problem, even though they have not tackled it directly—especially Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Eberhard Grisebach, and Jean Wahl. Standing, as he likes to express it, 'on the frontier' between philosophy and theology is a thinker whose works are of the highest importance for our subject, Paul Tillich, whose little book on *The Religious Situation* is available in an American translation, but whose untranslated works, especially the volume of essays entitled *Religiöse Verwirklichung*, are of still greater interest.

Tillich is a distinctively and staunchly Protestant thinker, and as such has close affinities with the very remarkable band of Protestant theologians who have risen up since the War, especially in Germany, to represent the trend of which we are speaking. First there was Rudolf Otto's *Idea of the Holy*, which may fairly be described as a document of the transition. But as early as 1918 came the first edition of Karl Barth's theological commentary, *The Epistle to the Romans*. The most systematic of Barth's works, and therefore the most suitable to be placed on our list is, however, his recently translated *Doctrine of the Word of God*; though even here he seems to evade many difficult and ultimate issues that must arise in every reader's mind. But of the stimulus which Barth has provided to theological discussion in our time, there can be no question. Many works written under his influence would have to be included in a more complete list; but let us mention at least one—Emil Brunner's early brochure,



*Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube.* From the mention of Karl Barth, it is natural to pass to that of Karl Heim, whose influence on recent Protestant thought in Germany has been almost equally widespread, and whose most important work has recently been translated into English under the title of *God Transcendent*.

Three books may be mentioned as offering useful information with regard to these most recent directions of thought, Dr. Walter Lowrie's *Our Concern with the Theology of Crisis* (Boston, 1932), John Cullberg's *Das Du und die Wirklichkeit* (Upsala, 1933), and Ernst von Aster's *Die Philosophie der*

*Gegenwart* (Leyden, 1935). Yet our last word must be to repeat that the student who is not well grounded in the history and greater classics of his subject, is little likely to be able to keep his head among these excited contemporary discussions.

*Postscript.*—Since writing the above, two translations have been announced which must now be included in our list—Tillich's *The Interpretation of History* (which includes certain parts of *Religiöse Verwirklichung*) and Brunner's *Philosophy of Religion* from the same German series as Przywara's *Polarity*.

## In the Study.

### Virginibus Puerisque.

#### The Second Mile.

BY THE REVEREND DR. C. W. BUDDEN, M.A.,  
CROYDON.

'The measure you deal out to others will be dealt back to yourselves.'—Lk 6<sup>38</sup> (Moffatt).

ONLY this week I discovered a text I had never noticed before—a curious and interesting text in one of those books of the Bible we don't often read: the Book of Ezekiel.

Ezekiel tells in his book about a dream he had in which he saw his beloved city of Jerusalem with its Holy Temple under ideal conditions—a vision of what might be if everything were perfect. In his dream he is taken round the Temple, and all the details of its furnishing are described. So he comes to the altar where men are to lay their offerings and he gives the measurements of the altar. He doesn't say it is eight feet long and three feet high because these are English measurements—but he says it was so many cubits each way, and then adds this curious text: 'The cubit is a cubit and an hand-breadth.' Doesn't that seem strange? It is like saying: Our Holy Table is eight feet long. A foot is one foot and a quarter.

So I looked up this strange measurement in one of the books of my library to see what it meant. I knew what a cubit was. It was the distance from the elbow to the tip of the finger; and I knew what a hand's-breadth was: the width of the open hand. We still use measurements like these. I daresay

you have seen your mother measuring cloth by holding one corner to her nose and the other at the end of the outstretched hand, for that is almost exactly a yard. And we speak of horses being so many 'hands' high. You never hear of a 'six-foot' horse or a 'seven-foot' horse—but that he stands so many hands high. But what kind of a cubit was one which was a cubit and a hand's-breadth? Well, it was what the people in Babylon called a 'Royal' cubit. It was the measure which the king, and the king only, used. Suppose, for example, the king were to be supplied with some royal purple cloth and he had ordered his weavers to make it three cubits wide—then they would make it wider than for ordinary people, for they would measure by the 'Royal' cubit. Equally, were the king to be giving a present of cloth to a subject—as when King Ahasuerus gave Moredecai apparel of blue and white and a garment of fine linen and purple—it would be measured by the 'Royal' cubit, for the king's generosity should be greater than the generosity of his subjects.

Then I understood what Ezekiel meant when he spoke of the altar of God being measured with this particular kind of cubit. It was to be the measure of men's gifts to God, and the measure of His gifts to them. It was what our Lord meant when He said: 'If any one shall compel thee to go a mile—go with him twain,' that is, be ready to give, and to do just twice as much as you are asked. Do you remember our Lord saying that when we have done all that we have been told to do—we must say, 'We are unprofitable servants.' That is rather

remarkable, and a little unexpected, isn't it? We think it would be reasonable to say, 'I've done what I was told, and that's one up to me.' 'I've done my duty. I've done what I ought to have done.' The duty I ought to have done. It is interesting to note that the word 'ought' is the same as the word 'owe,' and the word 'duty' is the same as the word 'debt.' We say a man ought to pay his debts. We don't praise him for that. When father sends his cheque to the school for your education, and mother pays the grocer's bill for the weekly housekeeping—we don't make a song about it, and say that they have done something for which they ought to be highly praised. Our Lord says that doing our duty is only just right, and to be expected.

You see Jesus takes it for granted that we will always do our duty, but He expects that we will go beyond our duty and do something more. We will measure with the royal measure—the cubit of duty and the hand's-breadth more! We will not be content to do what is commanded, and stop there; we will do our best, and always wish we could do better. Our dozen is to be a 'baker's dozen'—the twelve that are paid for, and one thrown in out of good-will. That is to measure with the royal measure. Is this a hard programme? Of course it is a hard programme. That makes it worth doing. Any one can do easy things.

In business we hear of people investing money and drawing dividends. But only the people draw the dividends who have invested their money. No one else gets anything, and what we take out is in proportion as we put in.

I read the other day of a lay preacher who went to take duty at a little village chapel. 'As he went in, he saw in the porch a collecting-box. Thinking it was for the poor, he slipped half a crown into it, and went on into the vestry. After the service was over, one of the office-bearers came to him in the vestry, and after thanking him for the service, he said, "You will understand that we are poor folk and unable to pay anything by way of fee, but we have a box in the porch, so that any who have been helped by the service and feel grateful, may put something in, and whatever is found in it, we ask the preacher to accept towards his travelling expenses. I am delighted to be able to tell you that to-day we found *half a crown in it!* Will you accept that with our thanks?"

'He smiled, and took it and went his way. When he got home and was sitting at the table with his wife and children, he told them the story, and they had a good laugh together. When they had finished

laughing, the eldest boy remarked, "Well, you know, Dad, if you had put more in, you would have got more out" (Mystery Tours).

Let our resolve be to measure what we do for others with the 'Royal' cubit. And the happiness we shall get will prove the truth of the text: 'The measure you deal out to others will be dealt back to yourselves.'

### The Whitewash Coach.

By THE REVEREND JOHN WILDING, B.A., NEWBURY.

'Let a man examine himself . . . —I Co II<sup>28</sup>.

Boys, large or small, young or old, will agree that there is hardly a subject in the world more interesting than trains. Of course we have cricket and football, but you cannot enjoy cricket in the winter or football in the summer. Trains you can enjoy all the year round. And I think that they grow more interesting every year, for we seem to have newer and faster trains with more and more comforts for the traveller. The days when the train jogged and jolted along are gone for ever. We can now go swiftly and smoothly to our destination. The greatest improvements in rail travel in recent years are in the steady running of the coaches, and on the Great Western Railway, which is just one hundred years old, this is largely due to the running of the whitewash coach.

This must be the strangest coach that ever ran on any railway! In it there are jars of colour from which run pipes with an outlet under the coach. An engine with the whitewash coach attached sets out. The line is a bit uneven, and whenever there is a jolt a splash of colour is thrown on to the line. Actually the jolt throws an electric relay into action: this opens a valve, and through the little pipes beneath the coach comes the splash of colour. Behind the coach come the men whose task it is to look after the line. They see the splash and they know that the line is uneven. Owing to the speed of the train the splash is deposited about sixty feet farther on from the uneven place, so back they go to find the cause of the jolt and to correct it. In this way the track is regularly inspected and smooth running is increased.

The idea is one that can be applied to life. We all would like our life to run smoothly for ourselves and for other people. We none of us really enjoy those jars or jolts caused by our bad temper, our forgetfulness, our greed, or our laziness. Then why not run a whitewash coach? I mean, do what many great men and women have always done. When you go to bed each night try and remember



what has happened during the day. When you come to anything which gives you a jolt, something which makes you feel unhappy or ashamed, make a note of it and determine that *that* shall not happen again. Mark it, and correct the trouble on the next day's run. If you do this before you say your prayers, you might ask our Father in heaven to give you special help.

Father, lead me day by day,  
Ever in Thine own sweet way.

## The Christian Year.

FIRST SUNDAY IN LENT.

### The Broken Vigil.

'What, could ye not watch with me one hour? Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.'—Mt 26<sup>40</sup>. (R.V.).

While we must not ignore or even minimize the guilt of the offenders, if we are ever to gain true insight into this episode of Christ's Passion-tide, neither must we over-emphasize it. Generally speaking, those who fall into the error of such over-emphasis do so by attaching insufficient importance to two facts. Of these two facts, the first is Christ's own pronouncement that the cause of this disastrous and blameworthy sleep of the disciples was not sloth but exhaustion—'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.' The implied mitigation of the disciples' offence should of itself be sufficient warning to us against passing too hasty a judgment upon this specific act of these men. The second circumstance ought, perhaps, to have as great weight with us in enabling us to avoid an over-censorious estimate of the disciples in this matter. The circumstance is nothing less than the existence of the narrative itself. It is simple truth that this event could never have been put on record at all except upon the information of those who had been guilty of the weakness which it reports. And in that confession there is no attempt to exculpate themselves.

The dismissal of the question of blame is not, of course, to be identified with the dismissal of the consideration of the fault. We are bound to give our attention to the fault as a means of adding to our enlightenment concerning the Atonement. It is beyond all doubt true that the broken vigil of the disciples added something to the burden of Christ, and intensified in some measure the exquisite suffering entailed by Calvary.

These words, 'What, could ye not watch with me one hour?' constitute a real comment on the humanity of Christ in their note of bitter disappointment. We may say that the condition in which Christ found His followers upon His first coming to them from His solitary agonizing was by Him totally unexpected, and must have been borne in upon Him with the force of a blow. He had gone to His Agony, confident in their sympathetic presence. Even as He had journeyed with them to the hallowed spot of His communion with God, He knew that these men loved Him. On that brief walk from the supper-room to Gethsemane their love had ministered to Him by its sustaining influence upon His heart. Having tasted of that loving sympathy, He had made a fresh call upon its resources, in the wistful request, 'Tarry ye here and watch, while I go and pray yonder.' So with a confidence in their loving nearness to Him, Jesus left His disciples and betook Himself to the lonely spot of His Agony. On His return, He found that His faith in them had proved illusory, that His confidence had been misplaced. In spirit these men were not near Him. Such was the origin of the disappointment which Christ voiced in His first reproach to them. We need merely note, as a further light upon the pain it brought to Jesus, the emphasis which He put upon the smallness of the request He had made, 'Could ye not watch with me one hour?'

The disappointment which Christ experienced upon discovering His followers asleep must have presented Him with an acutely dangerous temptation, which may be regarded as the first effect upon Him of their inopportune slumber. Direct from His agonizing over His imminent ordeal, and with His physical vitality perilously low in consequence, He came upon these followers of His. The shock to His entire moral being, contingent upon His discovery of their failure to watch, must have been, at least momentarily, devastating in its effects upon Him, draining His heart of its high courage, and tempting Him seriously to doubt the value of His divine enterprise.

We may assume that our Lord's recovery from this wholly unexpected and disquieting attack upon His spiritual poise was immediate, and that His mastery over the temptation to despair, to which it subjected Him, was at once overwhelmingly complete. This conclusion is justified, not only by the subsequent events of the Passion and Crucifixion, but also by the strong yet tender solicitude which He displayed immediately on behalf of those who had failed Him in His hour of need.

The relevance of this solicitude to the final exercise of Christ's self-sacrifice should not be overlooked. The very immediacy and completeness of His recovery from the blow He had received were productive of another effect upon Him, which must be considered in relation to His death on Calvary. We may, perhaps, grasp the true import of this new effect upon Christ in the following manner. It is certain that any radical adjustment of the entire moral nature may never be attained without the payment of a heavy price in physical vitality. Macbeth, for instance, in his resolve to pursue an evil course which was repugnant to his moral being, found it necessary to

bend up

Each corporal agent to this terrible feat.

Not less do the physical powers become involved in the determination to *resist* evil; and the more immediately such a resolution is taken, and the more speedily it is acted upon, the greater is the drain upon the bodily strength. In the case before us, the strenuous and victorious resistance of Christ, alike to shock and to temptation, could scarcely do other than leave Him terribly shaken.

Another consequence of the disciples' tragic failure may be seen in the radical difference between our Lord's spiritual outlook on His first leaving them and that of His second departure. His confidence in these men was an integral part of His spiritual condition, as He first set His face towards the spot of His Agony. As He departed from them the second time, that confidence had given place to the bitter knowledge that He was now bereft of all real human support in His anguish. The presence of this element of disillusionment would be still further increased by the repetition of His discovery of the torpor of His followers. The words, 'Sleep on now, and take your rest,' uttered at His third coming, and immediately before the arrest, imply the failure of Christ's hope that, after His solemn warning, these friends of His would redeem the time.

If there had been a belated fulfilment of this hope Jesus would not only have had the comforting assurance that, by a timely penitence, His disciples were once more in spirit by His side, but the realization of that hope would have removed from Him all anxiety for their spiritual well-being.

If we are to understand the central importance of Christ's warning to His disciples, we must look on it as addressed to them on their behalf and for their benefit. It is the voicing of His anxiety for their souls. As Pascal well says: 'Jesus, in the midst

of this universal abandonment and of His friends chosen to watch with Him, finding them sleeping, is perturbed by reason of the danger to which they are exposing not Him but themselves.'

The arrest of Jesus may justly be regarded as constituting for the disciples a challenge to their loyalty towards Him. The manner in which they met this challenge provides all too ample evidence concerning how deeply their souls had been affected by the evil inherent in their insidious and ill-advised sleep.

In that moment, panic-stricken terror laid hold of their hearts, and those safeguards which, had they but watched with Christ, would have secured both their spiritual integrity and their self-respect, were swept away by its action upon them. Of these men it came to be written, 'They all forsook him and fled.'

'One thought more may bring to a not unfitting conclusion our contemplation of this Garden scene of the Passion-tide. We have dealt with the effects of this sad event upon Him as if these were easily separated entities. Nevertheless, they were not so separated in the consciousness of Jesus Christ. For Him, they were fused into one experience, the supreme importance of which, in relation to the final Atonement, lies in its indivisible wholeness.

We cannot begin to conceive of the force of this evil influence, nor can we ever hope to come within distance of understanding it. We may but acknowledge its existence as a factor which increased the final constraint of Christ's self-sacrifice, and rejoice in its annihilation through His victory on Calvary. In shamed silence we contemplate anew this Man, betrayed, deserted, denied, and burdened with anxiety for those who had treated Him thus.

In holy awe, we behold Him, as He moved forward with indomitable will overcoming these subtle manifestations of evil, to the accomplishment of that purpose of redemption which proclaims Him the only-begotten Son of God, 'full of grace and reality.' And standing thus, amid the Garden of His pain, enraptured by His presence, we find our hearts the captives of His glory, and rest in His dying yet undying love.<sup>1</sup>

## SECOND SUNDAY IN LENT.

### Faith.

'Looking unto Jesus.'—Heb 12<sup>2</sup>.

In the New Testament there are two main positions taken up concerning Jesus Christ.

<sup>1</sup> A. G. Paisley, *Fine Linen for Purple*, 35.



The first is that He is the disclosure of God. 'The Word became flesh and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten of the Father.' God 'hath shined into our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.' 'God . . . hath spoken to us in a Son . . . the effulgence of his glory and the very image of his substance.'

The second is that He is the anticipation of the human future. We are 'foreordained to be conformed to the image of His Son that we might be the first-born among many brethren.' We may be 'transformed into the same image from glory to glory.' We are to 'attain unto a full-grown man of the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.' 'If he shall be manifested, we shall be like him.'

1. Not very long ago in the *Yale Review* there was an article written by a woman, who was discussing the question of the clue to the meaning of the world. 'There is,' she says, 'a beauty, rarely but positively perceptible, which silences Job himself. Not the much touted beauty of Nature or the only less touted beauty of art; for they are accidental and sensuous. The æsthetic sense is the way out, probably; but the æsthetic sense turned upon purely human and, I mean, personal values. . . . No better phrase for this single saving thing can be found than "the beauty of holiness." . . . The least deceiving thing this side the flaming ramparts of this world is a human personality. There can be no higher delight than in contemplating perfection; and while perfection we admit is not of this world . . . there can be visible approaches to it, superiorities, at all events, so great that they quite transcend our mean categories. It is, I believe, a human character so subtly purged, so fine, so incorruptible, that it seriously deceives nowhere that can give the highest form of æsthetic satisfaction. It is only to some human being we can say: "The whole sad earth you justify."'

The writer rescues for us a forgotten truth. The highest æsthetic value and the highest moral value are one and the same. Supreme goodness and supreme beauty are the same thing. The writer calls this quality 'the beauty of holiness.' And she is right. But there is a better word for it—the word 'grace,' when it is specified, as it is in the New Testament, as 'the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.' What the writer of the passage omitted to say is that the perfection which she desires to see did once appear in this world; and it was known as Jesus of

Nazareth. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews after quoting the Psalmist's saying that God has crowned man 'with glory and honour,' goes on to say that this had not come to pass, 'We do not see man crowned with glory and honour.' But he proceeds, even though man is not crowned with glory and honour, 'we see Jesus because of the suffering of death crowned with glory and honour.' In Him we see the ultimate goal and the new beginning of the human race. When Mr. Walpole's *Rogue Herries* had at the end of his long tumultuous life found peace in the perfect love which for long tormented years he had sought, he said, 'Life has a meaning. At last, at last, it has a meaning. One fine hour is enough.' And that one fine hour on the Cross is enough. It is to Jesus Crucified we say: 'The whole sad earth you justify.'

2. But because Jesus is the disclosure of the divine nature, He is also the disclosure of the divine intention. He is no accident, no anomaly—no chance personality that has wandered 'out of the everywhere into here.' Our destiny is to become men and women like Jesus Christ. How can that be?

'Let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus.' *Looking unto Jesus*, we keep to the course. On most golf courses there is a blind hole or two. One stands on the tee, but cannot see the green. But in order that we may know the direction, a pole is put up at a convenient point on a straight line between the tee and the green. Life can be likened to playing a game of golf as well as to running a race. For in life, as in golf, there are fairway and rough, bunkers and hazards, ups and downs; and in life, as in golf, we may miss or fizzle our drives, slice our shots or pull them, come short of the green or overshoot it. But whether in life or in golf, the first thing is to know which way to go. Jesus is our direction. He is the sign that shows us the way. Here are we, put down here in this world: and there is a 'go' in our bones. We know we are meant to go somewhere. We are creatures of destiny: but our journey's end is not in sight. How then are we to know the way? Sometimes life has been likened to a pilgrimage, and the classic story of that pilgrimage is Bunyan's. The description of Christian when we first meet him is: 'I saw also that he looked this way and that way, as if he would run, yet he stood still because I perceived he could not tell which way to go.' So Evangelist says to him: 'See yonder wicket gate,' and bids him make for it. In life we are like golfers playing a blind hole; and Jesus is the sign that gives us direction. We

are like pilgrims lost in a wilderness; and Jesus is our wicket gate.

But why Jesus? First, because He is, as we have seen, the disclosure of God who is our goal. 'He that seeth me,' said Jesus, 'seeth the Father.' 'No one cometh unto the Father but by me.' We are like men with defective sight. We take off our glasses and see people before us as a sort of general blur; but when we replace our spectacles we see before us a number of faces. The lenses have brought them within our range. And so in Jesus, God has come within our range: and to make for Jesus is to make for God.

Second, we would say this: Call to mind the great and good men and women whom we would choose to be like—St. Francis, Father Damien, Elizabeth Fry, Jane Addams—any one of the great figures of light and love and character in the last two thousand years; and we find that together we have assembled a very notable company: and we would also find that they had this in common—that they had run the race, looking unto Jesus. H. W. Massingham, towards the end of his life, went back to the life of Jesus, and there, he said, he found 'elemental stuff,' and that 'out of it was made all the goodness that I have ever come in contact with.' When we run the race, looking to Jesus, we are in the best company in the world; and unless our moral sense is all out of plumb, we know deep down in our souls, past doubt, past argument, that the way that great company is travelling is the way for us.

Then, looking unto Jesus, we shall also stay the course. For we shall find that He is not a stationary landmark, a fixed sign-post. He is the beckoning, encouraging friend. The one word which every soul that looks intelligently at Jesus finds written all over Him is the word *Come*. Sometimes He finds us men and women cold and stubborn; and His face is clouded over; and He says, 'Ye will not come to me that ye might have life.' But He still goes on bidding us come. Sometimes He says, 'Come after me, and I will make you fishers of men,' calling us to the honour of partnership with Him; and when He sees that the going is hard for us, and that we are bowed beneath the burden and heat of the day, He calls out to us still, 'Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.' If there be within hail a soul dead in trespasses and sins, He cries out as once He cried to a dead man, 'Lazarus, come forth!' And He speaks with authority. At His word, dead souls come to life; sick souls take up their beds and walk; tired pilgrims take the road again; and spent runners

get their second breath. We shall stay the course, if we run 'looking unto Jesus.'

And as we keep and stay the course, a miracle goes on. We grow like Him. And that is no fairy-tale. It has happened to a company that no man can number; and that same wonder may happen to us to-day.<sup>1</sup>

### THIRD SUNDAY IN LENT.

#### The Humiliations of Life.

'In Damascus the governor under Aretas the king kept the city of the Damascenes with a garrison, desirous to apprehend me: and through a window in a basket was I let down by the wall, and escaped his hands.'—2 Co 11<sup>32</sup>†.

It is distasteful for a man to speak about himself, but sometimes it becomes his duty. The Apostle was being taunted at Corinth by some who insisted that their religious credentials were better than his. They sought to discredit his gospel by undermining his reputation, and in self-defence he felt obliged to state his record.

I have been often at the point of death; five times flogged by the Jews, three times beaten with a licitor's rod, once pelted with stones, three times shipwrecked, adrift at sea for a whole night and day, in danger from rivers and robbers, and so on. If I've anything to be proud of, he remarks, with a touch of humble passion, it is these experiences of helplessness and hazard through which God brought me, as I sought to discharge my vocation. And then suddenly he flings his mind back to the incident of our text—something that happened at the very opening of his Christian career.

It comes in abruptly. We ask, What made him recollect this particular episode? Memory no doubt has its own ways of working. Still, this mention of the escape from Damascus sets us wondering why he put it in, at the close of adventures so much more exciting and serious. Had some of his critics recalled it, sneering. 'This was how your fine Apostle began his career—by running away from the post of danger?' Perhaps so. But we believe there is a most profound explanation. He recalled it because it gave him his first experience of the humiliations of life. He had travelled north to Damascus in the panoply of ecclesiastical authority, as a brilliant young leader of the Pharisaic party, one to whom every local Jew was bound to show deference. Even after he had joined the Christians, he had expected to have his services instantly accepted; he had imagined that he would be able

<sup>1</sup> R. Roberts, *For the Kingdom of God*, 62.



to transfer his gift of leadership to the new cause, and be gratefully welcomed. And a week later he was flying for his life, smuggled out of the city ignominiously during the night.

St. Paul remembered that, just as John Knox remembered the nineteen months of slavery on the French galleys after he had accepted his vocation from God at St. Andrews; it came so soon and so unexpectedly after his wonderful experience of a vocation from Jesus Christ.

What are the humiliations of life? Well, it is humiliating to be disgraced by the misconduct of some member of our own family, or of our church, or of our nation, by scandal or blundering on the part of incompetent persons in our group, or by misdemeanours that sully the fair shield of a cause to which we are devoted. It humiliates us to have any slur thus cast upon what is dear to us. The high-minded man resents any discredit brought upon his profession or society by an unworthy adherent. St. Paul knew that bitter taste of humiliation; there are some men, he once wrote, speaking of shameless, self-indulgent Christians, there are some men of whom I have told you often, and now tell you with tears, that they are enemies to the cross of Christ.

It is humiliating also to fail ourselves, humiliating to be exposed for some error we may have made in act or statement. Years later, we may recall the very time and place, and as the memory of some reproof flashes upon us, we are hotly ashamed of ourselves for having lost our temper, or for having been silly and careless. Only, we know we have deserved the humiliation, and if our nature is sound we are to-day the better for it morally.

Even when some humiliation is only partly deserved, this is true. Thus, when St. Paul did reach Jerusalem, he was surprised and vexed to find that his profession of Christianity was not at once credited. He tried to join the little society of Christians, but they were all afraid of him, and believed not that he was a disciple. Although their attitude of distrust was in a sense unfair, he could not but feel in cooler moments that he had brought it upon himself. It is always humiliating to have a past which we must live down, even though we may be honestly trying to live it down.

Stuart Wood, in his book, *Strange Triumph*, tells us of his feelings when he saw the posters announcing his lecture—Come and Hear the Ex-convict. His vanity was hurt so deeply at being made a public exhibition that he contemplated deserting. “‘So,’ I said to myself bitterly, ‘this is how it’s always going to be! Here am I nicely clothed and in my

right mind, a Brotherhood Badge parked in my buttonhole, and the author of two books. Was ever a friend so treated before! I won’t go. If this is religion, I’m better without it! I’m going home!’ But I didn’t. To be quite honest, the central issue for me has boiled down to this: Am I willing to face that sort of poster wherever I go?”

Nevertheless, there are personal humiliations which are not deserved. We may argue that even our Lord was sensitive on this point. When the armed troops came to arrest Him in Gethsemane, He protested, ‘Have you come out as against a robber with swords and clubs?’ He felt the indignity of being treated as a common criminal, as a pest to society; just as the punishment of death on the Cross with its disgrace was part of the shame He had to bear. So with St. Paul. Here, as elsewhere, we feel how such charges hurt him to the quick. But there is a moral grandeur in bearing all this. We cannot help seeing a nobility and a real heroism in people who hold to their course through good report and ill report; though their personal honour may be assailed and their word doubted, they refuse to allow such insults to cling to their minds or to abate their activities.

St. Paul’s case was specially trying. He seemed to live it over again in memory. *Let down—in a basket!* He had meant to do so much at Damascus for the cause. And it all came to this—to a stealthy, unheroic escape from the post of danger, because not only was his own life in peril, but his very presence in the city endangered the safety of his friends and compromised their position!

I remember, he says, fourteen years ago being caught up to the third heaven in a rapture of spirit. Ah, but I remember, too, says the Apostle, something farther back still in my life; I remember over twenty years ago being lowered—being *let down*, lowered *in a basket!* I recall how God forced me to undergo that indignity, how against my will He stripped me of my pride. I remember the first time I was made to realize that I did not count for so much as I thought.

Such experiences of humiliation may be petty, but it is the petty things that often sting and wound us, especially when they come on the back of some great and happy experience. Very few things try our mettle and test our quality better than the sudden consciousness that we—we!—are at the mercy of other people or of Nature, and that we must submit for the time being to be managed or to be misunderstood. Such reverses of fortune are a crucial discipline. We mean to lead. We are to head the venture. And the first

thing we know is that we are crippled or hemmed in. We get the salutary lesson that we are not self-sufficient. It is a cold splash flung disconcertingly upon our early self-confidence.

Canst thou, thy pride forgot, like nature pass  
Into the winter night's extinguished wood ?  
Canst thou shine now, then darkle,  
And being latent feel thyself no less ?

Two final thoughts, then, on the compensations for the humiliations of life.

One compensation is, that they serve to remind us of our dependence upon other people. Independence is a fine quality, but it should not be carried to the point of ignoring our dependence upon less active and original natures in our group; and sometimes it requires the humiliating experience of physical weakness or of poverty or of being at one's wits' end in a practical emergency, to make us realize that help has not simply to be given but sought in the sharper hours of human life.

Then, again, such experiences enable us to learn more of God. Pride rules our wills more than we commonly realize, sometimes it is not the proper pride which accompanies humility, but pride in ourselves, a pride which dwells upon our reputation. We need to have that pride purged, and purged it is by the discipline of undeserved humiliations which befall the most loyal in the service of their Lord. They do teach us that checks and contradictions are to be expected. Fortunately, as a French writer reminds us, the sharp humiliations of life are frequently forgotten; we do not console ourselves for them, we forget them, and forget them just because we are sensible enough to be busy with further duties and opportunities, so that we have no time to waste upon self-pity or on the practice of brooding over past rebuffs and slights. Yet, when we do happen to recall them, we know that they have been good for us in the long-run. They have made us, perhaps, more thoughtful and considerate of other people, less self-conceited too, and that is a sure initiation into the spirit and the mind of Christ. Some of the humiliations about which we have been speaking are not to be avoided, for they may come into the lot of the most serious and devoted. It is not our fault if we sometimes feel a twinge of shame as we look around us. No, there is only one serious humiliation in life which ought to weigh upon the conscience, and that is the mortification of knowing that we have gone down through our own fault. Is there any humiliation after all like the shame of having failed our friends at some critical moment, thanks to our incompetence

or selfishness? Is anything more bitter than the consciousness that then and there we turned out to be unfaithful to the Lord by shrinking from some inconvenience and discomfort in the service of the great cause to which He has not been ashamed to summon us? <sup>1</sup>

#### FOURTH SUNDAY IN LENT.

##### Can we leave our Brother behind?

'Ye shall not see my face, except your brother be with you.'—Gn 43<sup>3</sup>.

The story from which our text is taken is one of the most memorable in the Old Testament—unexampled for its human and romantic interest. It is also of interest because it belongs to the patriarchal period of Hebrew history, when the family was still the unit of social life. It is really the story of the chances and vicissitudes that befell a family, of which Joseph is the hero; and, while we are made to follow the course of his dramatic adventures with particular interest, we are not allowed to lose interest in the family or in the fact that in him the family was to be blessed and saved from the nemesis that threatened. At a later stage in Hebrew history it was the nation that became the unit, and it was for the nation that both family and individual life were to be sacrificed.

It is this Caiaphas had in mind when he said: 'It is expedient that one man should die for the nation, rather than that the whole nation should perish.' The Hebrews regarded the individual, not as standing by himself, but as related to and finding his life and salvation in the family, in the tribe, and finally and most fully in the nation. Apart from the social unit, whatever it was, he had no real standing or even existence. If he committed a sin against the family, tribe, or nation he was cut off, and usually, like Achan, stoned. The real social bond of the family or tribe was love, and if that bond was broken, the whole community was endangered.

In this instance, when the family bond was broken and Joseph sold into slavery, the whole family was under a curse. They could never as a family come to God, for the way was blocked by the murdered form of love lying on the threshold, over which none of them could step into the holy Presence. Neither could they come as individuals, for when they tried to pray to God, they could only hear a Voice relentlessly crying in their conscience, 'Where is thy brother?' Not a doubt that they meant murder; for in selling him into

<sup>1</sup> J. Moffatt, *His Gifts and Promises*, 185.



slavery they felt sure he would die, and they would never see his face again. But God is always bringing good out of evil. The ruling idea of the story is expressed in the words, 'Ye intended evil against me, but God intended it for good.' The intention to do evil must not be lightly glossed over. God is determined that all anger, envy, malice, hatred, all that Jesus called a breach of the sixth commandment, must be for ever banished and driven out of human life and relationships; and to this end He brings those things into the exposure of the light, so that they may be seen for what they are.

So we may take this as axiomatic. We cannot hope to come to God if there is in our hearts any stubborn or unloving refusal to have our brother with us. No loveless soul can ever see His face. 'Whoso hateth his brother is a murderer, and ye know that no murderer hath eternal life abiding in him.' He is a centre of death rather than of life, of darkness rather than of light. He is the very opposite of what God is. He is shut out of all knowledge and vision of God. 'He that loveth not, knoweth not God.' 'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.' The suggestion is that if one is pure in heart he cannot be unloving. That is the literal truth. To harbour resentment, to have a bitter or an uncharitable thought is to be guilty of impurity. It seems an alarming interpretation to put on the Beatitude, but it is Christ's own. It is full of startling and far-reaching possibilities. Purity means more than being free from gross or unclean thoughts, more than having morally clean thoughts. It means having loving and generous thoughts, gracious thoughts, thoughts of peace. No one can have peace either in his heart or in his home unless he has purity. There is no heart so unsettled as the impure heart. 'The wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt. There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked.' We shall never find domestic peace where there are wrong relationships, and the root of all wrong relationships is impurity. 'The wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable.' Purity is the condition of all right and harmonious relationships. Any failure in harmony is a failure in purity, the condition of seeing God's face. Any remnant of resentment, hatred, or grudge blocks God out effectively.

So let us think of these words spoken not by Joseph but by God Himself. 'Ye shall not see my face except your brother be with you.' Many do act as if they could go on with their worship and be religious without reference to their ordinary relationships. They seem to imagine that religion is

altogether a question of divine relationship, that so long as they have a purely spiritual relationship with God, they need not worry much as to whether or not they are in right relationship with their fellow-men. But there is no such thing as a purely spiritual relationship. We cannot detach ourselves from the world in which we live and from the relationships we have one towards another. These have everything to do with our relation to God—in fact, their importance is primary, not secondary. They are the determining things in our relation to God. 'For if a man love not the brother whom he sees, how can he love God whom he does not see?' There is no practical way of showing our love to God except through our love to our brother. If we have a wrong relationship with him, we are out of relationship with God.

It will be with us as it was with the poor millionaire, and he *was* poor, who, when he was a child, used to pray for a white pony. 'O Lord, send me a white pony.' He continued that prayer all his life till he was an old man, though he had enough money to buy thousands of white ponies. It simply meant that he was vaguely conscious of some big unrealized wish, the biggest wish in his life. He had lived for himself, struck himself free from all human relationships, in so far as that is possible, and set himself the task of making money, of getting on, no matter who had to get off in the process. He succeeded only too well in what he set out to do, but it was not the biggest wish of his life, after all. The white pony stood for that, and it was not something that he could buy with money. It was like happiness, something that must come to him; that is why it was the prayer of his life, a prayer that could never be answered, not unless he was willing to let go all his possessions, and make amends for all the wrongs he had ever done to others.

If we have done any one a wrong, if we have sold him into Egypt, sold him so completely that it may be impossible for us to redeem him again—he may be beyond our power—we must just do the best by the brother that remains. It was because of the wrong the brethren had done to Joseph that their little brother had to be left behind. It is a parable of how the disabling effects of our wrongdoing work out on others. Joseph knew that in leaving the little brother behind they were showing a consideration not only for Benjamin but also for the old man, their father, that was quite unusual. Yet he must see if these men are in any real way different from what they were. So he puts them to the test. He knew that the old man, their father, would never let Benjamin

out of his sight, unless on the condition that the brothers, one or all of them, went surety for his life. This is what actually happened. Judah, who was the best of them, went surety for his brother's life. And that is about the only atonement we may be able to make for the wrong done to a brother who is beyond our power to help, who may be dead and gone—just by giving our life in surety for the brother that remains.

Some years ago C. F. Andrews, friend of Gandhi, told a company of ministers that, though he was a priest of the Anglican Church, he could no longer worship with any freedom or joy in the Church of his baptism, could have no real communion there, unless he could bring with him his brown Indian brother to the altar. There were those who heard him who could not understand why he took the matter so deeply to heart. It surely could not be so serious a matter as all that. But it is.

'Ye shall not see my face except your brother be with you.' If there is any inhibitory motive

in our worship with regard to our brother, or if we feel that we have been wronged by him and owe him a grudge, it is no use going on with the service or act of worship. We must put things right with our brother first; or, at all events, we must be ready to put them right the moment an opportunity occurs, if we would behold the glory of our Father's face.

It is not simply a question of doing a kind turn or a good deed to one in need; it is a question of doing something Christ-like and redemptive. It is when we go all out in real love to those in need and see Christ in the least likely and least likeable, when we are not ashamed to call even the outcast our brother, and in Christ's name claim for him a place at His feet, bringing him with us to the church we worship in, or to the altar we kneel at, or to the home we live in, that we see the face of God and realize why it is so often hid from our sight.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> E. Macmillan, *Seeking and Finding*, 93.

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## The Teaching of Theology.

### III.

BY THE REVEREND ARTHUR DAKIN, B.D., D.THEOL., PRINCIPAL OF THE BAPTIST COLLEGE, BRISTOL.

In following Canon Raven and Dr. Garvie in this series I must begin by making clear that I have in mind the theological seminary, which consists of a very small body of students and has its eye fixed upon the ministry of the particular denomination to which it belongs. It comes to us from the past bringing with it a tradition and an ethos. In late years, however, the tradition has been modified and the method and curriculum changed accordingly.

Of necessity in an earlier day it incorporated that idea of the sharp distinction between the sacred and the secular which Canon Raven rightly repudiates. Consequently the students for the ministry were segregated, they lived a shielded life almost like monks, and gave themselves to intensive study with little contact with the world of men and things. This inevitably led to a narrowing of both mind and interest, and tended to exalt the training for the ministry as against the development of personality towards a general culture. Then, as specialization became more and more

necessary, the breach between ministerial training and general culture was further widened. The same thing happened also in other professions. A medical or an engineering course gives no guarantee of culture. A man may be well primed in one branch of knowledge and yet be quite ignorant of others. That seems to be the price we are paying for the tremendous accumulation of knowledge which characterizes our age. Only in the ministry this lack of general culture is the more serious because the minister must touch so many lives in his calling, and his very subject, namely, religion, has to do with the sum-total of life and experience. A relatively ignorant specialist is not unknown in the ministry. But, on the other hand, neither is the jack-of-all-trades, who can talk on all subjects and is an authority on none. How to overcome this difficulty—in my judgment the cardinal difficulty of ministerial training—is not easy to say. Canon Raven would have many more subjects added to the curriculum, and others would supply



a different list in some points from that of the Canon. But the fact is that time allows but a limited number of subjects to be taken, and any new subjects can be added only at the expense of the old. The question is not how much we ought to teach, but how much we can teach, and, out of the whole, what subjects, when taught, will best contribute to the end in view. Always a selection has to be made.

This leads to the second point which came in the tradition of the seminary, which also has undergone modification, namely, that the training is vocational. The seminary aimed simply at fitting a man for the ministry. Dr. Garvie would make a distinction between the teaching of Theology and the training for the ministry. But until now, in the seminary at least, the teaching of Theology was regarded as the essential part of the ministerial training.

Then, according to the old educational idea, the training consisted largely of the informing of the mind, giving not merely guidance on how the work of the ministry could be done, but also imparting those ideas, the proclamation of which constituted the minister's main task. His chief work was to proclaim the Truth, and his training in the main consisted of enabling him to lay hold of the Truth which he had to proclaim. That such an idea is still abroad is well attested, and the criticism often heard is that the colleges do not tell men what they ought to preach (or else tell them the wrong thing), nor do they teach them how to preach it.

As against this point of view, some, who have considered the subject from the inside, would say that this vocational aim is entirely wrong. You cannot convey by tuition the things that are really important. On the practical side, for example, it is utterly impossible to give a rule of thumb for dealing with every emergency that will arise in his pastorate. One cannot publish a typical letter of sympathy to a bereaved mother, or arm every student with a formula for dealing with a drunkard. Equally is it impracticable to provide a number of stereotyped sermons for the main themes of the gospel. Truth is not static, neither is personality, and a cast-iron system of theology at the age of twenty-four is no qualification for the Christian ministry, but rather a very serious handicap. In fact, the vocational conception, it is maintained, rests on an entirely wrong idea of education with a false psychology at the back of it. As against this, it is argued, the sole business of the college is to make a man *vital* by the training and

development of his personality. A *vital* man will progressively adjust himself to the needs of his work as he comes to it, learning quietly all his life, as learning is required for facing new situations.

This position in the main seems to me sound, and yet some element of vocational teaching, it would seem, has to be retained. Canon Raven votes for a thorough training in the Classics as the best means of securing vitality of mind. Yet his own article seems to lament the inadequacy of a training that stops there. After the Classics must come Theology. Hence, as I see it, the real problem is to find a range of subjects which will serve the main purpose of training the mind, and at the same time be useful for the vocation. Some such idea as that evidently lay at the back of University curricula for theological degrees. The aim was to promote such study as would be a fairly severe and prolonged discipline and yet at the same time inculcate a body of really useful knowledge. In this latter part, the knowledge was rather knowledge of the background, historical chiefly, than such as would be immediately useful for preaching purposes. Thus, here also it was knowledge for the sake of knowledge, such as makes an educated person rather than a mere imparting of information. The ministry would spring out of the education not out of the sum-total of knowledge.

So that the question arose whether this system really does educate (some doubt it), or how can it be modified so as to produce a better education still?

Here we ought not to overlook the modifications which have come in recent years. Many men who condemn the colleges are thinking of their own college course of thirty or forty years ago. But since then education has advanced very much, and the colleges have moved with the times. Thus the omitting of prolonged study of Hebrew where that is deemed desirable is not uncommon. Dr. Garvie's suggestion that there should be a history of Christianity down to our own times, and Canon Raven's idea that the great body of revelation in its sweep should be grasped—both these have in some colleges been already secured. As to the teaching of the impact of Christianity on modern political and economic situations and conditions, I doubt whether this can be done effectively, but I hold that the lecturer on both Church History and the Bible should be very much alive to these aspects of life. The actual application of the religion will come out of a man's vitality when he is face to face with the facts. But in college he should be quickened so as to be ready to make that application when the time comes. Such

quickening should be the outcome of the right handling of the subjects taught. Living methods of lecturing, and living lectures are obviously desirable.

May I venture, in conclusion, to offer for the purposes of discussion what might be a few ideas for a satisfactory curriculum.

1. First in the elementary stages—Mathematics, English Language and Literature, and at least one classical language, Greek (if only one is taken). If a man is not good at mathematics that would be a good reason, in my judgment, for his taking the subject, and so also of Greek. Both offer a splendid discipline for the mind, mathematics ministering to habits of reasoning and clear expression, and a language to habits of precision as well as the education that comes from contact with a different culture.

2. Then the study of the Bible and Church History will give in outline at least the religious development from early times. In the Old Testament the development of the religion and just such knowledge of the critical questions as makes a man wise in the use of the book. Here the approach should be not from the side of literary criticism but from that of religion and revelation. A new emphasis more than anything else is required. [It ought to be said here that much work of this kind has recently been done by the Society for Old Testament study, and is thus entering into our colleges.]

In the New Testament Jesus and Paul are the

dominating personalities, and here, again, I would prefer the emphasis to fall on the personalities and their work rather than on a mere study of questions of authorship, etc. New Testament Introduction ought to be quite subordinate to the greater question of the Faith.

Then, thirdly, the history of the Church with detailed study of the early days, and as far as possible of the later days since the Reformation, the whole giving an outline of the continuous development.

3. The third section would comprise Theology, Philosophy, and Comparative Religion—the aim being to get some idea of the history of thought, to exercise the mind on fundamental problems, with a view to working out ultimately a coherent philosophy of life.

4. In addition to all this there would be lectures on Homiletics and Pastoral Theology, including some Psychology, etc.

Some such combination of subjects as this would provide fairly good discipline of mind and at the same time set a man towards the acquiring in the years of a gradually increasing acquaintance with the field of theology. But whatever the curriculum, the aim of the college should be to give a sound education and not a mere *ad hoc* course. All I have written presupposes that the seminary is dealing mainly with men who have not had the privilege of a university education. For these obviously a different approach and curriculum would be required.

## Contributions and Comments.

### Bible Chronology.

My brother, Dr. J. K. Fotheringham, who died at Oxford on December 12th, was the acknowledged 'Liaison Officer' between historians and astronomers. It was a unique position of his own making, and apparently there is no one at present to take his place. A passion for strict accuracy caused him to turn his attention to chronology; and I write these lines in the hope of preserving some of the most important of his ascertained conclusions.

Those of most interest to Biblical scholars are these: (1) The date of Abraham; (2) The fifteenth year of Tiberius (Lk 3<sup>1</sup>); (3) The date of the Crucifixion.

As to the date of Abraham, opinion or conjecture had ranged over five or six centuries. But a precise date can now be given from the contact with Amraphel king of Shinar (Gn 14<sup>1</sup>). Amraphel is identified with Hammurabi, whose date can now be fixed astronomically. The argument is that in the reign of Hammurabi's fourth successor Ammisaduga, there lived at Babylon a patient and painstaking astronomer, who carefully observed and recorded for twenty-one years all the first and last appearances of Venus in the morning or evening sky, on the occasion of each conjunction with the sun. From this the date of Hammurabi, contemporary with Abraham, can be definitely fixed 2067–2024 B.C. The credit for this ascertained date must be divided



between members of the Weld-Blundell expedition (who discovered the canon of kings); the late Father Kugler, S.J. (who identified the 'Year of the Golden Throne'); Dr. Langdon, Professor of Assyriology; and my brother, who supplied the astronomical calculations.

For the 'fifteenth of Tiberius,' scholars had no help from classical authors or ecclesiastical writers, since the Romans generally reckoned either A.U.C. or by the consulships; and the date was vaguely treated, with various conjectures as to what St. Luke might mean, or from what event he might conjecturally be counting. My brother's contention was that a precisely given date must have a precise and definite meaning; and he set himself with characteristic thoroughness to ascertain that meaning. It became clear that reckoning by the year of the Emperor's reign was the actual rule in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire, and that each year could be precisely identified. The 'fifteenth of Tiberius' is the year A.D. 28-29.

For the date of the Crucifixion it had been recognized already that there was an essential contact between history and astronomy, since it was necessary that the fourteenth of Nisan should fall on a Friday. Unfortunately astronomers, having largely given up naked-eye astronomy in favour of telescopic work, were not generally in a position to answer the question asked by the historians. My brother analysed 76 observations of Julius Schmidt at Athens, in terms of the altitude of the moon and its azimuth—distance from the sun at the moment of sunset, in order to find a rule for the commencement of the lunar month. Later, in conjunction with the late Mr. Carl Schoch of Berlin, he examined and analysed more than six hundred records of the commencement of lunar months at Babylon, extending over many centuries. The resulting rule was clear. The Crucifixion of our Lord falls either on April 7th, A.D. 30 or on April 3rd, A.D. 33. All other dates are excluded.

These results have all been published, but they have not been included in any recent Bible Commentary or Encyclopædia. So there is a danger that students may still be induced to follow or accept erroneous dates given in easily accessible books of reference, published before these calculations were available. We may trust Professor Langdon to see that the Babylonian Chronology is put right. I write now for Biblical students or historians who may be interested in the chronology of the Life of our Lord.

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## The Parables of the Tower Builder and the King going to War.

THE study of the parables in English has entered on a new phase with the publication of Dr. A. T. Cadoux's *The Parables of Jesus* and Dr. C. H. Dodd's *The Parables of the Kingdom*. The parable must henceforth be treated as a distinct art form and allegorical interpretations avoided. In particular our interpretations must be governed by the principle that, while in the allegory each detail of the story has a significance of its own, in the typical parable there is but one point of comparison, and the details, without independent significance, go simply to build up a realistic story.

Turning to Lk 14<sup>25-33</sup> we are struck by the fact that the usual interpretation of these two parables lacks the aptness and the inevitableness which the two scholars referred to have taught us to expect in the parables of Jesus. They are generally treated as twin parables enforcing the lesson, 'count the cost,' or, as Dr. Dodd puts it, 'take great risks with open eyes' when confronted with the call of Jesus.

Dr. Cadoux treats the two not as parallel but as complementary to one another (*op. cit.*, 174). 'In the first Jesus says, Sit down and reckon whether you can afford to follow me. In the second, Sit down and reckon whether you can afford to refuse my demands.' Following this line of thought further one would suggest that these two parables become even more apt, with all the details co-operating to enforce the point, if we suppose that in speaking them Jesus had two different types of hearer in view. In the first He is addressing the aspiring idealist. Often in His audiences there must have been men like the rich young ruler or the youthful St. Paul, men with a zeal for holiness according to the Law, whose aim for their lives might well be symbolized by the building of a tower. To such men He says, 'Yes, your ideals are splendid, but have you resources in yourself to achieve them? Beware lest you begin and have to fall back into cynicism or despair. Build your tower, certainly; but consider if you can do it without Me.'

In the second parable He turns to the unaspiring or to those who find His call too disturbing and would like to ignore it. In His audiences there may well have been some, like St. Paul when he was kicking against the goads, who were disturbed by the gospel and yet, refusing to pay the price of discipleship, were attempting to harden their hearts and go on in the old way. 'I shall keep

this teacher at bay. I will not launch out on a mad adventure. I want to stay as I am and guard my territory from His disturbing appeals.' In the parable Jesus replies, 'Yes, you may try that, and you may have some success, for in a real sense you hold the sovereignty of your own life. You have ten thousand men at your command and you may fight hard to keep at bay the appeal of the Highest. But consider that I have twenty thousand men at My disposal. I have ways of getting at you that you cannot counter. Can you keep your kingdom against Me?' The story of Jonah and Francis Thompson's *Hound of Heaven* provide apt commentary.

Taking both parables together we find Jesus declaring that if men will only consider the deep issues of life they will be driven to His discipleship, for all deep and sincere handling of life leads to Him.

Such an interpretation of these two parables fits in well with the context. In Dr. Cadoux's words we find that in vv.<sup>26-27</sup>, 'Jesus refuses to take advantage of the peculiar psychological conditions of an enthusiastic crowd. He throws His hearers back upon themselves with utterances of such startling severity that the crowd must have been atomized into thinking men and women.' Then, in our view, He addresses two different types of hearer, and finally in v.<sup>33</sup>, if it be not disregarded as editorial, He returns to the demands of vv.<sup>26f.</sup>, insisting that whether His hearers be idealists or unaspiring folk who refuse to be disturbed, they had better come to terms with Him, and His terms are full surrender.

It may be objected that this interpretation, by making so much of the details of each story, is a reversion to the old allegorical method. To that we demur. Consider Nathan's parable of the ewe lamb. The general lesson here is that the rich must not oppress the poor. But the particular type of oppression described in the parable fits David's case all too well. Similarly, the general lesson of the parables before us, namely, count the cost, becomes in each case a forcible point when the details are taken into account as we have sought to do.

We suggest, therefore, that the principle of the single point of comparison mentioned at the beginning must not be pushed too far. Dr. Dodd makes that clear in his own interpretation of the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen (*op. cit.*, 124-132), and he allows all that we would contend for as regards general principles of interpretation when he says (p. 21)—'if the parable is drawn out to

any length, it is likely that details will be inserted which are suggested by their special appropriateness to the application intended, and if the application is correctly made by the hearer, he will then see a secondary significance in these details.'

STEWART MECHIE.

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## Matthew v. 38, 39.

IN a previous note reasons have been given for rejecting the R.V. rendering of μή ἀντιστῆναι τῷ πονηρῷ, 'resist not him that is evil,' and for questioning even the A.V. 'resist not evil.' It was suggested that the Rev. A. Carr's translation, 'do not seek to retaliate evil,' is more likely to be correct, and that St. Paul's 'render to no man evil for evil' in Ro 12<sup>17</sup> is a true reproduction of Christ's words. (See also 1 Th 5<sup>15</sup> and 1 P 3<sup>9</sup>.) It seems very unlikely that immediately following the phrase, ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ, etc., where ἀντὶ has the meaning 'in return for,' the prefix in ἀντιστῆναι should suddenly change its meaning to 'against.' The difficulty is that though the prefix ἀντὶ has the meaning 'in return for' in many words, and in at least one verb, ἀντιλαμβάνομαι, has sometimes this meaning, and sometimes signifies 'against,' there is no known example of the use of ἀνθίστημι in which the prefix means exactly 'in return for.' Nevertheless the meaning 'match with' or 'compare' in Plut. *Thes. i.*, mentioned in Liddell and Scott, is a very near approach to it.

Professor George Brockwell King of Winnipeg has sent me an article of his which appeared in the *Canadian Journal of Religious Thought* of Nov.-Dec. 1930. In it he discusses the whole passage, and gives evidence from Rabbinical writings that the Greek may be a mistranslation from the Aramaic. He quotes in the beginning of his article a passage from one by Dr. Richard Roberts, who stated that 'the translation "Resist not evil" misrepresents Jesus. The logic of the passage requires rather "Retaliate not upon evil." . . . It is not impertinent to add that the derivative ἀντισταβή means a pair of scales.' Professor King does not approve of the word 'retaliate' as the best equivalent, but suggests St. Paul's words in Ro 12<sup>17</sup> as more likely.

Liddell and Scott give an adjective ἀντίσταθμος with the meaning 'counterpoising,' 'in compensation for,' quoting Soph. *El.* 571. These derivatives from ἀνθίστημι must surely point to the fact that the verb itself had the meaning 'give in compensa-



tion for,' 'render in return for.' Hence the whole passage would read, 'You have heard that it was said, "An eye in return for an eye, and a tooth in return for a tooth." But I say to you, "Do not render evil in return for evil (or do not match evil with evil)."' Such a rendering may possibly, but not necessarily, mean that τὸ πονηρόν has been omitted from the text.

Jesus proceeds to apply the principle He has

laid down to insults, litigation, and forced labour imposed by the Roman government. In all these cases He urges that men should not give as good as they get, but 'overcome evil with good.' He is dealing here with the spirit of vengeance, not, as is often supposed, with the question of defending one's life or the existence of the State.

H. E. BRYANT.

Grimsby.

## Entre Nous.

### Current Affairs in the Pulpit.

What place should current affairs occupy in the pulpit, and how far is the minister justified in dealing with social questions which arise from week to week?

Preaching must deal with life and be concerned with seeing life in the light of God's face. We cannot afford to ignore the great unseen realities, but they must be related to the lives of common people—the eternal things found in present events. We are spokesmen for God as were the prophets in ancient Israel, and our task is not merely to see God's truth in relation to their own time as they saw it, but in relation to our own. It is important to hear the authentic voice of God in our time. Revelation has not ceased. God is still unfolding Himself, and each phase of life and each succeeding generation serves to reveal yet further reaches of His wisdom and His pity.

But there is reason for thinking that our social concern and our interest in current events have run away with us. Preaching should be something more than a running commentary upon the events of the past week. It should have scriptural background. It must hold on to the great central mysteries of our Faith which create awe and reverence. It must be conscious of God in the midst of life, and this gives to the preacher a steadfastness and a certainty that is seldom hurried or disturbed.

Sensational preaching lacks poise and staying power. It has no educational value and ultimately it defeats its own end. There is not a sufficiency of sensational things happening every week to sustain interest at a high pitch, so they have to be manufactured, or ordinary events have to be treated in a sensational way.

We are sent of God to declare His will and reveal His love. Our preaching should be saturated with the spirit of a great commission. But this spirit should be brought to bear upon the life of

our own times. While we should be fully informed on doctrinal subjects and familiar with the expository background of our preaching, we should find our subjects in life rather than in the books upon our shelves.

There is a definite place in the work of the pulpit for instruction and information. We neglect it at our peril. An illiterate church is a dangerous menace to our usefulness and a prolific source of heresy and superstition. But much of this instruction can be conveyed not by abstract academic presentation but rather in concrete and personal incidents around which, and in which, the religious truth is revealed. When we have some truth which we wish to present to our people, we should look for some Scriptural incident or character through which that truth can be presented. The truth must be translated into concrete and familiar forms, while the characters must be made to speak in modern terms. The traditional terms of our Christian Truth must be changed into modern thought-forms. In this way we can keep our background and we can continue to keep the Scriptures central in our work. Our preaching is too serious in its intention to be lightly turned aside to deal with passing events or to be swallowed up in a hectic series of sensational stunts.

Some men have solved the question of the place of current events in the pulpit by instituting a five minutes' talk on Public Affairs at some point in one of the Sunday services. It forms an item in the service apart entirely from the sermon. I have tried this method for some years at different periods, and I have found it successful. There need be no slashing attacks upon social evils nor violent tirades upon some recent event, but a sane Christian comment given by way of direction to one's people to frame and sharpen their own judgments, and to furnish them with information of the bearing of



Christian Truth about this subject which has intruded into public or social life.

Some social evils are complicated, and there are many sides to every question that arises. It is difficult for busy people who have neither the training nor perhaps the capacity to see the trend of certain movements or the results of certain actions. Here lies the opportunity of the minister. He can become familiar with a subject in most of its bearings. He ought to be able to summarise a many-sided question and give his judgment upon it as a Christian minister trained to declare the Will of God in relation to life.

It does not follow that his statement is final and authoritative for all his people. It should not be presented in an aggressive way. But many of our people would welcome a Christian comment upon Public Affairs. We ought to be able to gather up a situation in one handful for them and show the central and important things in it. We can give a lead to their thought and content to that thought.

The Pulpit Editorial can serve many purposes. I have used it successfully in giving Pulpit Reviews of Books which I thought my people should read, or I have told them about the book and given them a brief summary of its contents and significance. On special occasions I have given them a few historical notes on the origin of an event and its historical associations. Anniversaries, centenaries, deaths of famous men and women all provide opportunities for such comments. "Attention can be called to the pronouncements of the leaders of Christian thought and to movements within and without the church. Charitable appeals and collections for special purposes in Christian Missions present an excellent opportunity for the minister to give a vivid cameo sketch of the Charity, or the Mission in some one of its many activities.

Most public events and social occurrences have a religious or moral side, and this side is the one generally ignored in the Press. This is our opportunity to supply what is missing. It is advisable to avoid what are known as party issues. No minister of Christ has a right to belong to any party so exclusively that his party allegiance to Christ is obscured.

The minister must be equipped and prepared to handle subjects when they are thrust into prominence. This involves a knowledge of things other than are found in theological text-books. Behind him there must be an ordered system of reference, so that in a few moments he may place his hands upon facts, figures, and opinions about the subject on which he wishes to speak. W. H. STUBBS.

Wolverhampton.

#### Rahator of Bombay.

It was while on his way home from India in the third year of the War that Dr. James Moulton died from exposure—his ship having been torpedoed in the Mediterranean. While he was in Bombay he saw a great deal of the work of the native India Missionary, Samuel Rahator, and when he got back to England he had meant to let the Methodist Church know something of what Rahator was doing. 'It was worth while coming to India to see Rahator,' he said. 'It is a purifying thing to find love like his in such appalling surroundings.'

An account of Rahator's work has had to wait for nearly twenty years. It has now been described by Mr. Frank Hart in a way that could hardly be bettered. He calls the volume (*Rahator of Bombay*: Epworth Press; 2s. 6d. net) not a biography but an 'appreciation,' and it was intended to mark the spiritual jubilee of this Indian Christian. On Easter Monday last year, just after the manuscript was finished, Rahator died. It should be noted that Mr. Hart is giving all the profits from the book to a fund which is being raised for the training of Lemuel Rahator, B.A., Rahator's youngest son, as a candidate for the Methodist Ministry.

Samuel Rahator was born of Christian parents. His father was descended from the Rajputs, and his mother belonged to an old Marathi family. It was while he was in Government service that his own heart was touched. In the early spring of 1885, General Campbell (then Major Campbell) was conducting Evangelistic services at Igatpuri. Many years later General Campbell attended a Missionary Garden Party at Richmond College, and he heard there for the first time the story of Rahator's conversion. He had sowed in faith and had his reward. Rahator went to Igatpuri because it was a novelty to listen to a British General doing the work of a padre. 'The most striking thing,' Mr. Hart says, 'about Rahator's conversion is the passion and adventure with which he made the supreme choice. . . . The day of salvation was to him the definite hour of enlistment. He said one day, "When Christ came into my life, He drew up all the blinds, opened all the doors, and His joy came blowing in from everywhere."'

In January 1887 the Rev. G. W. Clutterbuck landed in Bombay. He had been sent out from the Methodist Mission House to establish an English Church in Bombay, and one of the earliest entries in his diary was, 'I have engaged the services of a young Marathi Christian as our first Native Evangelist.'

'Rahatorji has shown us another way of doing



things,' so an Indian said when discussing the problem, almost a hopeless one it seemed, of the outcastes in the Bombay Presidency. His work for the outcaste was only a small part of all that he did, but it shows as well as any other perhaps what he was and what he was able to accomplish. He pitched his tent in the scavenger world and became a scavenger.

O wet red swathe of earth laid bare,  
O truth, O strength, O gleaming share,  
O patient eyes that watch the goal,  
O ploughman of the sinner's soul.  
O Jesus, drive the coulter deep  
To plough my living man from sleep.

He put his hand to the plough, determined to drive 'the coulter deep.' The implement that he used was courtesy, gentleness, unvarying kindness. He saw 'each man always as a man, respecting and honouring him as such, and in a thousand courteous ways making him aware of their equality.'

Every year the great simple truths that God lives, that God loves, that Christ is our Salvation, grew simpler and dearer to him. When he was nearing sixty, at the request of the Government, he took over the care of a large number of people of the criminal tribes. Behind all his work there lay long periods of solitary prayer. 'It is in the solitude of prayer,' he said, 'that we see our frail lives lifted to the heights and our commonest duties united to everlasting strength.' Rahator approached the men of the criminal tribes, Bhamptas and Mang Garudis, not as criminals, but as men, respecting the absolute value of each man's personality. 'If he was gentle towards their failures, and even indulgent to their vices, it was because he knew they would be cured once their will was set in the right direction. The value of the meanest unit of society was one of the fundamentals of his belief. It was this saving sense of the sacredness of personality, even outcaste personality, the glowing confidence in the salvability of all men, even habitual criminals, that gave him a hearing, and made his appeal successful where others had failed. He did not offer them a new religion, but confronted them with the actual thing, the strong, gentle, self-forgotten, persistent passion of a soul who brought to them the touch of Christ.'

Rahator did not leave much behind him in the way of Mission buildings or of elaborate Church organization, but the life that he lived will not soon be forgotten. And it was his life that told. He himself said, 'Argument is no good, it is like a sparrow going for an eagle; our lives must be our work.'

Mr. Hart has written of what he knows intimately; he has also a delightful literary touch, and he conveys to his readers the real atmosphere of the West of India. This is a little biography which should not be missed. Each chapter is preceded with quotations from Indian writings.

#### The Veil of Death.

'Verily thou art a God that hidest thyself, O God of Israel, the Saviour.'

Principal Wheeler Robinson in *The Veil of God* writes of six ways in which the vision of God can be obscured. This fine little book is the second volume in the Dean of St. Paul's 'New Library of Devotion' (reviewed under 'Literature'). The last chapter is on the 'Veil of Death.' It is not written for all Christians—not for those to whom death is but a welcoming door at the end of the journey. 'An old friend of mine, who has almost reached its threshold after a long life of faithful service, writes to me: "I cannot commune with men much now. I am rather deaf. But the doorway above is open, and I live mostly there."' The chapter is written for those who have not escaped the doubts and hesitations of the modern world as to the reality of life beyond death. 'There is, in fact, much more variety of outlook amongst Christians themselves than conventional statements would lead us to expect; indeed, there are often varying attitudes in the same man at different times.' Two questions Principal Wheeler Robinson puts: 'What are the obstacles to a Christian view of life after death?' and 'In what does the Christian view of life beyond death essentially consist?'

The chief obstacle is the contrast between the unknown forms of the life beyond and the warm familiarity of the life on this side of the veil that makes the unknown seem unreal. 'To-day, many a Christian shrinks from the unknown world where all that is familiar and dear seems left behind. I remember standing, as a youth, by the deathbed of a man who had lived a long and faithful Christian life, and I recall my surprise at hearing him say, "I don't want to leave all this." To my inexperience, the words seemed unnatural on Christian lips. I know now that they are natural, but that does not make them right. . . . The old-fashioned truth remains that we are strangers and pilgrims here, even though we may not, like Archbishop Leighton, feel that it is fitting we should die in an inn (a wish strangely granted him). Gustav Frenssen begins one of his remarkable village sermons with two simple incidents from his pastoral experience. The first is that of a little boy crying in the street, unable



to say where he lived or even to give an intelligible name. The other scene is that of an old woman dying, and as she looks round on the faces of her children and grandchildren without recognition, she says, "Nothing but strange faces!" He makes these incidents a symbol of man's state when, sooner or later, he is detached from the familiar but transient things of this world and brought face to face with "the deepest things" that are rooted in eternity. How will it seem to us when *we* are asked, "Who are you, and where do you live?" From this point of view the inscriptions on the monuments of church and graveyard are a strange comment on the Christian life, dwelling as they so often do on the familiar things of earth, its now forgotten achievements and irrelevant pride. There is something wrong with the emphasis of our life if such things figure largely in our own minds or those of our friends, when the time comes for us to die. . . . We miss the revelation God would give to us by letting ourselves become too much absorbed in the trivial and the transient. It is the abiding vision of the whole of things that we all need, so that, however busy we must needs be, some higher purpose informs and transforms things temporal

—to him who looks

In steadiness, who hath among least things  
An undersense of greatest; sees the parts  
As parts, but with a feeling of the whole.'

In what does the Christian view of life beyond death essentially consist? 'In this life there are both transient and permanent elements; it is a subtle blend of both. What are the permanent elements that make "eternal life," which Christian faith can legitimately project into the world beyond experience? Surely, all those that belong essentially to the new personality which God creates in us (2 Co v. 17; cf. iv. 6).'

'If the "values" of the spiritual life abide—and their very nature removes them from dependence on conditions of time and space, and demands an eternal world for its full expression—then the personality which they constitute also abides; indeed, they have no meaning apart from such a personality. If it be asked whether this means the continuance of individual existence the answer is plain. They are so bound up with the relations of individuals that they would become unrecognizable without them; a Christian fellowship in heaven as on earth implies such relation. A redemption of individual life such as Christian experience knows must point to fuller use of that which is redeemed at such cost, if this is a rational universe.'

Amy Wilson Carmichael.

We have welcomed many books from the pen of Amy Wilson Carmichael.

The S.P.C.K. has now published *Toward Jerusalem* (2s. net), which contains a number of her devotional poems. Many are old friends collected from the Dohnavur books, but some have been added to and considerably altered. Others appear to be new—in any case they are new to us. Very characteristic is the poem quoted:

#### IN ACCEPTANCE LIETH PEACE.

He said, 'I will forget the dying faces;  
The empty places,  
They shall be filled again.  
O voices moaning deep within me, cease.'  
But vain the word; vain, vain:  
*Not in forgetting lieth peace.*

He said, 'I will crowd action upon action,  
The strife of faction  
Shall stir me and sustain;  
O tears that drown the fire of manhood cease.'  
But vain the word; vain, vain:  
*Not in endeavour lieth peace.*

He said, 'I will withdraw me and be quiet,  
Why meddle in life's riot?  
Shut be my door to pain.  
Desire, thou dost befool me, thou shalt cease.'  
But vain the word; vain, vain:  
*Not in aloofness lieth peace.*

He said, 'I will submit; I am defeated.  
God hath depleted  
My life of its rich gain.  
O futile murmurings, why will ye not cease?'  
But vain the word; vain, vain:  
*Not in submission lieth peace.*

He said, 'I will accept the breaking sorrow  
Which God to-morrow  
Will to His son explain.'  
Then did the turmoil deep within him cease.  
*Not vain the word, not vain;  
For in Acceptance lieth peace.<sup>1</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> Amy Carmichael, *Toward Jerusalem*, 40.